SECURITY ANALYSIS OF A BASIS-INDEPENDENT
SCHEME FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

GELO NOEL MACUJA TABIA

(B.Sc.(Hons.), NUS)

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2009
To my family,

who are always there for me...
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to my thesis supervisor Prof. Berge Englert, for giving me with an interesting and fascinating topic to explore, for providing me valuable insights at various stages of the project, such as extremely helpful advice on which promising ideas to pursue and which veritable methods to attempt, and most especially for his mild-mannered approach and utmost patience in dealing with my struggles in this entire endeavor.

I would also like to express my heartfelt appreciation for all the support I have received from the Centre for Quantum Technologies, mostly in the form of facilities that definitely eased the burden of the many little chores of research like printing documents. I would also like to thank the NUS Department of Physics for providing me with a wonderful opportunity to teach tutorial classes during the final stages of my thesis write-up, an experience that I feel will be valuable for many years to come.

Finally, my continuing education would not be possible without the unwavering support of my dearest family and friends, for the many times they have encouraged me to carry on when things became difficult, and for relieving some of the pressures of those hard and trying moments. Many thanks to them.
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .................................................. 1
   1.1 Cryptographic Schemes ................................... 2
   1.2 Classical Cryptography .................................... 4
   1.3 Quantum Key Distribution ................................. 5
   1.4 Motivation for the Project ............................... 9
   1.5 Outline of the Paper ..................................... 10

2 Principles of Quantum Mechanics .............................. 13
   2.1 Basic Ideas in Quantum Mechanics ....................... 14
   2.2 Qubits ...................................................... 19
   2.3 Composite Systems and Entanglement .................... 21
   2.4 POVM Measurements ...................................... 23
   2.5 Distinguishing Quantum States ........................... 24

3 Review of Information Theory .................................. 29
   3.1 Classical Information Theory ............................. 30
   3.2 The Coding Theorems ..................................... 32
   3.3 Quantum Information Theory .............................. 36
   3.4 Information-Theoretic Notions of Security ............... 41

4 Trine-Based Protocols ........................................ 45
   4.1 A Standard Trine Scheme ................................ 46
   4.2 Generating the Key ....................................... 49
   4.3 Statistics with Noise ..................................... 53

5 The Double Trine Scheme ....................................... 59
   5.1 Constructing the Double Trine States .................. 60
   5.2 Eigenvalues of Arbitrary Linear Combinations of $S_1, S_2, \text{ and } S_3$ .. 63
   5.3 Cyclic Operator for Double Trine States ............... 64
   5.4 An Effective Quantum Channel between Alice and Bob ... 65
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

6 General Security Analysis 75
   6.1 Equivalent Formalism with Signal-Idler Qubits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
   6.2 Source with Eve’s Ancilla States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
   6.3 Finding the Optimum Information Bound on Eve’s Ancillas . . . . . . . 85
   6.4 Numerical Results for the One-Parameter Optimization . . . . . . . . . 88
   6.5 Asymmetry between Alice’s and Bob’s Conditioned Ancillas . . . . . . . 90

7 Concluding Remarks 97
List of Tables

4.1 Probability matrix for the standard trine protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 An example illustrating the PBC00 transmission processes . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Probability matrix for the trine scheme using a noisy channel . . . . . . 53
List of Figures

1.1 Flowchart for a cryptographic scheme involving Alice and Bob. The strings $e$ and $d$ refer to the encryption and decryption keys while the functions $E$ and $D$ refer to the encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively. The actual nature of the sets $E$, $D$ and $M$ depend on the specific scheme. In any case, they should contain a large number of elements if the scheme is to be secure. The term $\epsilon$ indicates the error in the scheme, which can result from (i) noisy transmission through the channel, (ii) imperfect encoding and decoding, and (iii) eavesdropping by Eve. . . . 3

1.2 Implementing BB84. Alice sends states one at a time from one of four choices. Bob measures the state Alice sent either with a detector for the horizontal-vertical (HV) basis or the diagonal basis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.3 Implementing E91. A source of photon pairs in the singlet state sends a qubit each to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob measure the polarization along the three directions indicated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.1 Bloch sphere representation of a qubit. Note that it is conventional to define the angles $\theta$ and $\phi$ such that qubit states correspond to spherical coordinates of points in the Bloch sphere. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.1 Relationships among different entropies. The diagram shows different sets pertaining to various notions of classical information (Shannon entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information) and depicts how they are related to each other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.2 Schematic for a noisy communication channel. If Alice wants to send a message $M$ to Bob through a noisy channel, Bob in general receives a different message $M'$. For sufficiently low noise, there exists an error-correcting code such that Alice can encode $M$ as $X$, transmit it through the noisy channel where Bob obtains $Y$ that he can reliably decode so that $M = M'$. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

4.1 Geometric representation for the qubit trine. The vectors depict the traditional choice for a normalized trine: $(1, 0), 1/2(-1, -\sqrt{3}), 1/2(-1, \sqrt{3})$. 46
4.2 Trine states in the Bloch representation. The kets are normally chosen to lie on the $XZ$-plane with one vector pointing along the positive $Z$-axis. 47

4.3 Mutual information between Alice and Bob in the noisy bit and trit cases of a typical trine scheme. 56

6.1 One-parameter case: Wiretapper bound for Eve during a bit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.196$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.561$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.170$, $I_{C-K} = 0.604$. 89

6.2 One-parameter case: Wiretapper bound for Eve during a trit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.193$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.619$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.150$, $I_{C-K} = 0.744$. 89

6.3 Optimizing with position order symmetry: Wiretapper bound for Eve eavesdropping during a bit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.197$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.560$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.170$, $I_{C-K} = 0.603$. 93

6.4 Optimizing with position order symmetry: Wiretapper bound for Eve eavesdropping during a trit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.193$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.618$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.150$, $I_{C-K} = 0.744$. 93
Summary

We propose a rotationally-invariant quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme that utilizes a pair of orthogonal sets of qubit trine states. A qubit trine describes a set of three quantum states that form an equilateral triangle on the Bloch sphere. In a QKD setup where Alice sends states to Bob, the double trine scheme makes use of mixed states composed of singlet states attached to a random qubit. The manner in which the double trine states are defined guarantees that the measurement outcomes of the scheme are independent of the reference frames chosen by Alice or Bob.

One primary feature of this scheme is that it produces two sets of cryptographic keys, namely a bit key and a trit key. The resulting noiseless mutual information between Alice and Bob is approximately 0.573, which is 98% of the Shannon limit and exceeds by a considerable amount the efficiency of other trine-based schemes such as the PBC00 protocol, which reaches 85.5% of the Shannon limit.

From the security analysis we discover a glaring asymmetry between Alice and Bob, where Eve finds it more advantageous for her to eavesdrop on Alice’s raw key. The discrepancy in the accessible information is explained by the unbalanced nature of the process in generating the key, which gives Eve different conditioned ancillas for Alice and Bob. We find that the absolute noise threshold for the double trine scheme is $\epsilon = 0.17$ for the bit case and $\epsilon = 0.15$ for the trit case, which Eve attains by optimizing a single parameter.
Chapter 1

Introduction

In this modern age of computers, rapid technological advances in electronic data processing and telecommunications have paved the way for a huge and ever-growing volume of information being exchanged across the Internet. The emergence of a global online community has spurred novel ways for people to interact and do business. Nowadays, almost any type of commercial transaction can be conveniently carried out via the World Wide Web, the most common kind involving ordinary people buying and selling goods online. These transactions typically involve the disclosure of confidential information between the parties concerned. Anyone who has purchased a book from Amazon using his credit card will be well-aware of this fact. Therefore, it has become as vital as ever to ensure the secrecy of such private communications. This is where cryptography comes into play.

Cryptography is the art of protecting information from any unauthorized access. It falls under the broader field of cryptology, the science of code-making and code-breaking. Its history stretches far back to the ancient Greeks, where it played a critical role in military strategy. This particular function has continued over the centuries. In more recent times, cryptographic tools featured prominently during World War II. During the war, the Germans possessed the Enigma machine, a mechanical contraption of gears and motors used to encode and decode messages for purposes like issuing commands and transmitting military intelligence. Much of the Allied success of the D-Day landing at Normandy can be attributed to the successful cracking of the Enigma code.
Once largely confined to the domain of the military, cryptography is now in widespread use, and you are likely to have encountered it without realizing it. At present times, secure transmissions happen daily in the bustling online activity of the Web, involving vast amounts of sensitive data such as bank accounts, computer passwords, and personnel records, from people at practically all social levels: individual users, organizations, multinational companies, and government agencies. There is a legitimate concern about unauthorized disclosure of valuable, private information and modern cryptographic techniques have been developed to address this issue.

In this chapter, we briefly explore the two main branches of cryptography: classical and quantum cryptography.

1.1 Cryptographic Schemes

The central aim of cryptography is to enable two parties to communicate in a secure manner. In the traditional scenario, Alice wishes to send a private message to Bob. To guarantee that the information remains secret, they use a cryptographic scheme or protocol in transmitting the message. A protocol is an ordered prescription on how to encode and decode a particular message so that it becomes unintelligible to possibly malicious third parties. The coding is done in such a way that only the intended recipient of the message is capable of deciphering the hidden information. To achieve this goal, a special algorithm is implemented such that a message is combined with some additional information called the key. The key is composed of a genuinely random sequence of characters. The message and the key combined together form a cipher; this step in the protocol is known as encryption.

To an outside observer, a cipher is often utterly meaningless. However, an intended recipient of the message is provided a means of breaking the cipher with a key of his own. Depending on the particular algorithm used, this key can be identical or different from the sender’s key. By applying the key to the cipher, the original message is retrieved from a set of symbols that appears to be totally gibberish. This other process is called decryption. The techniques for encryption and decryption form the cryptographic
Alice and Bob share a pair of secret strings $d \in \mathcal{D}$ and $e \in \mathcal{E}$.

Alice wishes to send message $m \in \mathcal{M}$.

Alice encodes the message into cipher $c = E_e(m)$.

Bob receives cipher $c$ from Alice and decrypts it to get $m' = D_d(c)$.

If encryption $E$ and decryption $D$ are error-free, $m = m'$.

Otherwise, $m' = m + \epsilon$.

Figure 1.1: Flowchart for a cryptographic scheme involving Alice and Bob. The strings $e$ and $d$ refer to the encryption and decryption keys while the functions $E$ and $D$ refer to the encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively. The actual nature of the sets $\mathcal{E}$, $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{M}$ depend on the specific scheme. In any case, they should contain a large number of elements if the scheme is to be secure. The term $\epsilon$ indicates the error in the scheme, which can result from (i) noisy transmission through the channel, (ii) imperfect encoding and decoding, and (iii) eavesdropping by Eve.

To demonstrate that a protocol is secure, one has to show that any attempt by an eavesdropper, whom we call Eve, to extract the message from Alice’s transmission is severely limited by the very design of the scheme. To establish the security mathematically, we can show that for several general forms of attack the amount of information that the eavesdropper can retrieve is bounded by a certain rate called the Holevo bound, which goes to zero in the asymptotic limit of an infinitely long key.

Note that by utilizing a key, the burden of security is transferred from how to transmit the message privately to how to secretly share the appropriate key. The advantage of using a key now becomes apparent: if somehow somebody is able to intercept the key...
as it is being communicated, the eavesdropper acquires no direct knowledge from the key since the key itself contains no useful information. Roughly speaking then, cryptographic security implies that the cipher cannot be broken by any systematic brute force attack on the scheme, that is, an exhaustive key search cannot be successfully completed in any reasonable amount of time.

1.2 Classical Cryptography

Cryptographic methods that do not utilize quantum laws fall under classical cryptography. A general introduction to classical cryptography can be found in a text by Katz and Lindell [1]. For a historical perspective, the reader is referred to a popular science book by Singh [2]. Much of the discussion in this section follows that of Pavicic [3].

Classical cryptography comes in two varieties: public key and private key schemes.

**Secret key or symmetric key cryptography** uses a single key for both encryption and decryption. The one-time pad or Vernam cipher, first proposed by Gilbert Vernam in 1926, is the prototypical example of a private key scheme. The protocol works as follows: the plaintext, expressed in binary digits (or bits) by a previously-agreed upon encoding, is added to a completely random key via modular addition. Referring to Fig. (1.1), we have \( d = e \) for the shared key and \( c = m \oplus e \) for the cipher. Claude Shannon proved in the 1940s that the key had to be at least as long as the plaintext message for it to be perfectly secure, provided it is used only once. Although the one-time pad is secure, it is not very practical since the key has to be changed frequently if many transmissions are required. Furthermore, there remains the question of how to distribute the key to the users at the offset in a secure and efficient manner.

**Public key or asymmetric key cryptography** provides a practical solution to the key distribution problem. In public key protocols, different keys for encryption and decryption are used. The encryption key is made public and widely distributed while the decryption key is kept private. Thus if Alice holds the private key, she can distribute the public key to anybody she wants to communicate with her privately.

The prime example of a public key scheme is the RSA protocol, named after its
developers Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman at MIT in 1977. To describe the algorithm, let us once again use Fig. (1.1) as a guide. To generate the keys, we start with two large prime numbers \( p \) and \( q \) or roughly the same magnitude. Let \( n = pq \) and \( \Phi = (p-1)(q-1) \).

Generate a random number \( e \) where \( 1 < e < \Phi \) such that \( \text{gcd}(e, \Phi) = 1 \), i.e. \( e \) and \( \Phi \) are co-prime or relative primes. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, we can then calculate \( d \) (\( 1 < d < \Phi \)) such that \( ed = 1 \mod \Phi \). Alice publicly announces \( (n, e) \) while keeping \( d \) as the private key. The encryption \( E \) and decryption \( D \) are then defined by the functions \( c = E_e(m) = m^e \mod n \) and \( m' = D_d(c) = c^d \mod n \). Due to the computational difficulty of prime factorization, the RSA cipher is practically secure when very large numbers are involved.

Public key cryptosystems address the many practical difficulties in distributing a shared key. However, a major drawback for public key schemes is that they have not been proven to be fully secure. Encryption and decryption keys are often generated using one-way functions, a function that is easy to compute but hard to do in reverse. However, using additional information, the inverse operation can also be performed easily. This additional information is contained in the decryption key. Since the private and public keys are related mathematically, an adversary with a sufficiently powerful computer may be able to deduce the private key using only the public key.

In classical cryptography, we see that there is a trade-off between the amount of concealment of data and the practicality of utilizing a particular protocol for data security, since in principle, classical schemes have inherent weaknesses that make them susceptible to some form of eavesdropping attack. Thus, we have to resort to private key schemes if we want guaranteed security. Fortunately, the laws of physics provides us with a wonderful solution to the whole issue of how to get Alice and Bob to share a common key.

1.3 Quantum Key Distribution

Classical cryptographic techniques fall prey to one major shortcoming: the security of the encoded data is not quite guaranteed. The vulnerability of classical protocols
stems primarily from unproven assumptions about the difficulty of performing certain mathematical operations, most notably the prime factorization of huge numbers. We have to incorporate quantum theory to develop protocols that are known to be provably secure. For a comprehensive review of quantum cryptography, the reader can refer to a paper by Gisin et al. [4]

Quantum key distribution (QKD) involves the communication of a secure cryptographic key between two parties in remote locations by exploiting the laws of quantum mechanics. It is a rather remarkable fact that the limitations imposed by natural laws on the behavior of physical systems is actually what allows for a perfectly secret key.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1.2: Implementing BB84. Alice sends states one at a time from one of four choices. Bob measures the state Alice sent either with a detector for the horizontal-vertical (HV) basis or the diagonal basis.

To illustrate how QKD protocols work, we provide here a short description of the

\footnote{Although quantum cryptography includes all sorts of secrecy tasks beyond just distributing a secure key such as data integrity and authentication, it is commonplace to identify it with QKD. In this thesis, we use the two terms interchangeably.}
prototypical BB84 setup (named after its developers Charles Bennett and Giles Brassard and the year the paper was published, 1984 [5]), the basis for many other quantum cryptographic schemes now available. Adhering to tradition, let us call the two communicating parties Alice and Bob. Alice chooses two pairs of orthogonal states, where states taken from different pairs are non-orthogonal to each other. These states correspond to the numbers 0 and 1 so that the key is in binary form. She then forms a random sequence of states from her four chosen states and sends the states one by one to Bob. Bob has with him a detector with two settings corresponding to a definitive measurement of states from one or the other pair. Since Bob is unaware of what state Alice sends him, he simply randomly selects a detector setting to measure with. After a sufficiently long sequence of states has been transmitted, Alice and Bob end up with a matched sequence of characters that contain correlations vital in producing a shared key. The use of quantum states allows Alice and Bob to reliably detect any attempt by an eavesdropper, customarily named Eve, to intercept the key since any measurement that Eve performs leaves a noticeable trace in the transmitted states. Figure (1.2) shows a diagram for implementing the BB84 protocol.

Another well-known QKD scheme that is a variation of the BB84 protocol was developed independently by Ekert [6], which we call E91. The protocol makes a connection with the famous paradox formulated by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) by replacing the channel through which Alice sends qubits to Bob by a common source of maximally entangled qubit pairs (the EPR state, usually the singlet), where Alice and Bob each receive one qubit. Distributing the qubits in this manner constitutes a quantum channel between Alice and Bob, although neither is sending any signals to the other party. Using Bell’s inequalities that apply to EPR states, one can check that the key resulting from the scheme is secure.

Figure (1.3) illustrates how E91 is implemented. Consider a source of correlated photon pairs. Two distant observers, again Alice and Bob, receive photons with polarizations along three directions which are 45° from each other. If Alice chooses randomly to measure spin components along 0°, 45°, and 90°, then Bob chooses to measure randomly at 45°, 90°, and 135°. They both keep a record of the results of their individual
Figure 1.3: Implementing E91. A source of photon pairs in the singlet state sends a qubit each to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob measure the polarization along the three directions indicated.

polarization tests, both the chosen direction and the measurement outcome for each photon pair. After a sufficient number of photon pairs have been analyzed, the two observers publicly announce the sequence of directions they chose but they do not give out the corresponding results of each test. In roughly half of the cases they will choose the same direction and they will have correlated results due to the entangled nature of the photon pairs. This particular set of correlated results can be used as a secret key. The results of polarization tests performed on different directions may be used for eavesdropping control by checking if the measurement results obey Bell’s theorem.

It is important to also check for errors since there may be instances where two photon pairs are emitted almost simultaneously and only one photon of such pairs are detected. This may create a mismatch. To ensure that both keys are the same the observers may publicly disclose the parity of the sum of randomly chosen subsets of bits. Sophisticated methods of verification and privacy enhancement have been developed for
such a purpose.

Both the BB84 and its variant E91 are qubit-based cryptographic systems, that is, schemes that use individual qubits as signals. Qubit-based systems are the most widely studied quantum systems due to the simplicity of analyzing the kinematics of a qubit. Qubits are also easily realized with a setup involving photon polarization or electron spin. Although it is sufficient to look at two-state systems, there is a natural tendency to look at systems with more degrees of freedom, whether these are higher-dimensional quantum states (called qudits) or signals constructed from two or more qubits, generating keys with an alphabet of more than two letters [7]. Three-state systems are particularly interesting for quantum cryptography because they are the simplest systems that can involve symmetric, non-orthogonal quantum states. It should be possible to exploit the symmetry in such systems in analyzing the unconditional security of schemes that utilize these states. There also exist powerful theorems on non-orthogonal states [8, 9] which allows us to achieve minimal error probabilities and maximum information transmission in the quantum channel.

1.4 Motivation for the Project

This project deals with the security analysis of a rotationally-invariant three-state QKD scheme. In many practical QKD schemes, it is important for Alice and Bob to establish beforehand the coordinates they will use for implementing the scheme. This is so because the way their data will be correlated depends heavily on the measurement scheme they will use. Using rotationally invariant states eliminates this necessity since the quantum states are described through their relative orientations, not through an absolute coordinate system. In that case, Alice and Bob can independently choose their reference frames and the expected correlations for the measurement outcomes remain the same. Furthermore, such a reference frame-free scheme automatically corrects for errors that affect all qubits simultaneously, e.g. transmission of photons through optical fibers may include unwanted effects such as the polarizations undergoing a rotation as the photon traverses the fiber.
1.5 Outline of the Paper

This introduction talks about cryptography in general, the motivation for this project, and the outline of topics. Chapter 2 reviews fundamental ideas in quantum mechanics, with some emphasis on qubits, measurements, and the distinguishability of quantum states. Chapter 3 provides a broad overview of information theory, which includes Shannon’s coding theorems and their quantum generalizations, where special attention is focused on concepts relevant in cryptographic security analysis. Chapter 4 discusses the standard trine-based QKD scheme and two different methods of establishing a key in three-state protocols. Chapter 5 describes the main topic for the project, the double trine scheme, elaborating on the important mathematical details. Chapter 6 contains the general security analysis for a noisy channel, introducing a special formalism for simplifying this task and featuring the main result: the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland bound for the amount of information that Alice can obtain by any form of eavesdropping. Chapter 7 discusses some implications of the results, makes some further recommendations, and concludes the paper.
Bibliography


Chapter 2

Principles of Quantum Mechanics

In the realm of microscopic objects, the dynamics of physical phenomena is inherently probabilistic. Quantum theory asserts that exact outcomes for experiments in the small scales of atoms are unpredictable. This idea may seem bizarre at first but this counterintuitive notion helped explain one of the giant puzzles of the early twentieth century: the inexplicable dual nature of light and electrons. Depending on particular measurements used in an experiment, a quantum system exhibits either wave-like or particle-like behavior. Bohr called this phenomenon \textit{complementarity} and it suggests that quantum entities such as photons are profoundly different from classical systems in their physical manifestation; at times, they will reveal their particle nature, sometimes their wave properties, but never at the same time.

For almost a century, quantum mechanics at the level of atoms was a purely scientific enterprise. Technological advances that employ quantum laws, such as lasers or semiconductors, typically involve a system with a large number of quantum objects; hence, they are semi-classical by nature. It was only recently when practical applications at the individual quantum level were developed. Quantum cryptography leads the way as the first commercially available product of quantum information research. In Geneva, Switzerland, federal elections held in October 2007 used a quantum cryptographic system provided by the Swiss company ID Quantique [1]. Unbreakable security with quantum systems is possible because the physical laws that dictate their behavior impose well-defined restrictions on how much they can be probed. As the quantum rule
There are also other quantum ideas that have proven useful for developing new methods for information processing: (i) the uncertainty principle [2], which prohibits the simultaneous precise measurement of conjugate variables such as position and momentum; (ii) Bell’s inequalities [3], which sets correlations in measurement outcomes that go beyond classical bounds; and most importantly, (iii) entanglement, which provides an additional resource for performing tasks not possible with purely classical objects.

In this chapter, we look at some fundamental concepts in quantum mechanics that are important in studying quantum information. There are many excellent texts on introductory quantum mechanics and we refer the reader to Peres [4] and Ballentine [5]. For much of the discussion in this chapter, we use material presented in Nielsen and Chuang [6], Kaye, Laflamme, and Mosca [7], and Nakahara and Ohmi [8].

2.1 Basic Ideas in Quantum Mechanics

Quantum mechanics establishes a theoretical framework for constructing physical theories to describe how various physical phenomena work. A solid understanding of quantum theory involves a firm grasp of elementary linear algebra. To understand the fundamental ideas is not hard; in fact, the main postulates of quantum mechanics are easy to state and remember. Given these few set of rules, we can formulate physical laws that will accurately predict outcomes of experiments we conduct. We examine these basic ideas first.

Any attempt to describe how a physical system behaves begins with describing the state of the system. The state provides a complete description of the configuration of the system, which become observable when measurements are performed to determine specific properties. In quantum mechanics, the state is associated with a unit vector residing in Hilbert space, usually written by physicists as

\[ |\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}. \]
This notation is known as the *Dirac notation* and $|a\rangle$ is called a ket. The set of all possible kets form a Hilbert space, which is a complex vector space equipped with an inner product. The inner product is defined by first defining another kind of vector called a bra, written as $\langle b|$. In the language of linear algebra, kets and bras are duals of each other. It is sometimes convenient to think of them as being related by $\langle \psi | = |\psi\rangle^\dagger$. When a bra meets a ket, we get an inner product of two vectors, also called the bracket, e.g., $\langle b|a\rangle$.

In quantum information, the simplest quantum mechanical system of interest is the qubit

$$|\psi\rangle = |0\rangle\alpha + |1\rangle\beta,$$

where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are complex numbers such that $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ and the set $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ is called the computational basis. The condition on $\alpha$ and $\beta$ is called normalization and it ensures the state is a unit vector.

Oftentimes we describe the state not with a ket but with a wave function $\psi(x) = \langle x|\psi\rangle$, where $|x\rangle$ traditionally refers to a position state vector. The wave function is widely used for computational purposes not only because it is often the most convenient form to use but also because it provides a clear interpretation for the numerical results: the absolute square of the wave function gives the probability density function for various measurement outcomes. For example, $|\psi(x)|^2$ gives the probability density in terms of the position. You can then compute quantities like $\langle x\rangle = \int dx\ x|\psi(x)|^2$, the mean position of the system.

In many practical situations, we are unable to determine the exact state of a quantum system. Instead of describing the system as a pure state, we describe it as a classical ensemble of its possible quantum states. Every such ensemble can be associated with positive, Hermitian, linear operators of unit trace called *density operators* or *statistical operators*. It is also commonly referred to as the *density matrix*, which strictly speaking is the numerical description of the statistical operator and depends on the basis chosen for writing down the matrix elements. For pure states such as $|\psi\rangle$, the density operator
is a projector to the corresponding state vector,

$$\rho \equiv |\psi\rangle \langle \psi|.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.1)

Thus, for a pure state $\rho$, $tr\{\rho^2\} = 1$. Now suppose we have another system whose state is not completely known. If this other system can be in one of a number of states $|\psi_i\rangle$ with probability $p_i$ then we say it is an ensemble of states $\{p_i, |\psi_i\rangle\}$. The statistical operator which completely describes the state of the system is

$$\rho \equiv \sum_i p_i |\psi_i\rangle \langle \psi_i|.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.2)

A quantum system whose state is given by such a $\rho$ is called a *mixed state* since it is a mixture of pure states in a particular ensemble. It is worth noting that different ensembles can be associated with the same density matrix. For example,

$$\rho = |0\rangle \frac{1}{2} \langle 0| + |1\rangle \frac{1}{2} \langle 1|$$

and

$$\rho = |+\rangle \frac{1}{2} \langle +| + |-\rangle \frac{1}{2} \langle -|,$$

where

$$|+\rangle = (|0\rangle + |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.3)

$$|-\rangle = (|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2},$$

are states that correspond to the same density matrix, but involve different ensemble states $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ and $\{|+, |-\rangle\}$. We say that a *single mixture may be composed from many different blends*. Physically speaking, each blend represents a valid as-if reality for the mixture, none more legitimate than others.

A description involving density operators is completely equivalent to the state vector formalism. However, since the quantum state is usually not known in practice, it is often
more convenient to use the density operator approach for most applications.

Once we find the state that describes a quantum system, we can specify properties of the system based on its state. Such physical properties are called observables. In quantum mechanics, observables are frequently associated with Hermitian operators (more generally with normal operators), linear maps that take vectors to other vectors. For instance, in

\[ A|x\rangle = |y\rangle, \]

\( A \) is a linear operator and \( |x\rangle, |y\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \). If a linear operator \( A \) is Hermitian, it means its conjugate transpose is itself:

\[ A^\dagger = (A^*)^T = A. \]

For any given measurement, the possible outcomes are given by the eigenvalues of the corresponding Hermitian operator. The eigenvalue equation states that

\[ A|a_i\rangle = |a_i\rangle a_i, \quad i = 1, 2, ..., N \quad (2.4) \]

where \( a_i \) is the eigenvalue of \( A \) associated with eigenstate \( |a_i\rangle \). One note on Hermitian operators: they can be expressed in terms of their eigenstates and eigenvalues (in general, this can be done for any normal operator \( N \), i.e. \( NN^\dagger = N^\dagger N \)):

\[ A = \sum_i |a_i\rangle a_i \langle a_i|. \quad (2.5) \]

This is called the spectral decomposition of \( A \), and it is often the convenient form of a linear operator in numerical calculations.

We have formulated a quantum description of state and observables; next we can explore quantum measurements. To determine the properties of a system, we have to make measurements of the relevant physical observables. In quantum mechanics, measurements are described by a collection \( \{ M_j \} \) of linear operators. If \( |\psi\rangle \) is the state of the system before measuring, the probability that a particular result \( j \) occurs is given
by
\[ p(j) = \text{prob}(j|\psi) = \langle \psi | M_j^\dagger M_j | \psi \rangle. \]

The final state of the system after measurement is
\[ \frac{M_j |\psi\rangle}{\sqrt{\langle \psi | M_j^\dagger M_j | \psi \rangle}}. \]

The set of measurement operators obey the completeness relation:
\[ \sum_j M_j^\dagger M_j = 1. \]

This implies that
\[ \sum_j p(j) = 1. \]

Quantum mechanics deals with statistical outcomes. For any given measurement, the precise outcome cannot be predicted in advance; only probabilities for each outcome are known and they depend on the initial state of the system. Once the state \(|\psi\rangle\) is determined, we can predict the statistical average of measurements performed on a large number of identically prepared systems with initial state \(|\psi\rangle\). This should not be surprising since the single system probabilities obtained from \(|\psi\rangle\) are only realized in practice if ensembles are considered. For example, you know a coin is fair because when you throw it a large number of times, it ends up heads (almost) as frequently as it ends up tails.

As an example, let us consider measurement operators for qubits:
\[ \{M_0, M_1\} = \{|0\rangle \langle 0|, |1\rangle \langle 1|\}. \]

In Dirac notation, the ket-bra corresponds to a linear operator constructed from the outer product of two vectors. If the two vectors for the ket-bra are the same, the operator is called a projector. A projector \(|\lambda\rangle \langle \lambda|\) acts on any other vector \(|\phi\rangle\) by getting the component of \(|\phi\rangle\) along the direction of \(|\lambda\rangle\). Measurements using a collection of
2.2 Qubits

Projectors are called **projective or von Neumann measurements**. In the next section, we will look at more general quantum measurements called positive operator-valued measurements or POVMs.

We complete the discussion of the postulates of quantum theory by describing how the quantum state evolves in time. This is given by a partial differential equation called the **Schrödinger equation**:

$$i\hbar \frac{\partial |\psi\rangle}{\partial t} = H|\psi\rangle$$

(2.6)

where $H$ refers to the Hamiltonian of the physical system. What the Hamiltonian is depends on the particular system under consideration but it is normally expressed in terms of the position variables. Solving the Schrödinger equation formally yields

$$|\psi(t)\rangle = \exp\left(-\frac{iH(t-t_0)}{\hbar}\right)|\psi(t_0)\rangle = U(t-t_0)|\psi(t_0)\rangle.$$  

(2.7)

This tells us that the evolution of any closed quantum system can be described by some unitary operator $U$. Unitary means that

$$UU^\dagger = 1.$$  

2.2 Qubits

In classical information theory, the bit represents a basic unit of information. However, not all kinds of information can be expressed in bits. In particular, the description of quantum systems require something analogous to but more general than bits. For quantum information, the fundamental concept is that of a **qubit**.

Just as a classical bit represents the state of a binary classical system, the qubit represents a binary quantum state. Bits can be 0 or 1; correspondingly, qubits can be $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$. What makes qubits different is that they can also appear as linear combinations of $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$, called a superposition state. We recall from the previous section that a qubit state is written as

$$|\psi\rangle = |0\rangle \alpha + |1\rangle \beta,$$  

(2.8)
where \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{C} \) and \( |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1 \).

We know that qubits are decidedly real and not just some mathematical curiosity because various two-level systems can be used to realize a qubit: polarizations of a photon, alignment of a nuclear spin in a uniform magnetic field, two states (ground and excited) of an electron orbiting an atom, and so on.

Since \( |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1 \), we can express the state of a qubit, up to an overall phase factor that has no physically observable effects, as

\[
|\psi\rangle = |0\rangle \cos \left( \frac{\theta}{2} \right) + |1\rangle e^{i\phi} \sin \left( \frac{\theta}{2} \right),
\]

(2.9)

where \( \theta \) and \( \phi \) are real. In this form, we can represent the state using the pair of angles \( \theta \) and \( \phi \) on a unit sphere. This way of visualizing a qubit is called the Bloch sphere representation. It is shown in Fig. (2.1).

A qubit can also be defined in terms of a set of operators called Pauli operators. The Pauli operators and their standard matrix forms are

\[
I = |0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1| \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix},
\]

(2.10)

\[
X = \sigma_x = |0\rangle\langle 1| + |1\rangle\langle 0| \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
Y = \sigma_y = |1\rangle i\langle 0| - |0\rangle i\langle 1| \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -i \\ i & 0 \end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
Z = \sigma_z = |0\rangle\langle 0| - |1\rangle\langle 1| \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}.
\]

A qubit can then be written as

\[
\rho = \frac{1 + \vec{r} \cdot \vec{\sigma}}{2}, \quad |\vec{r}| \leq 1.
\]
Figure 2.1: Bloch sphere representation of a qubit. Note that it is conventional to define the angles $\theta$ and $\phi$ such that qubit states correspond to spherical coordinates of points in the Bloch sphere.

Pauli matrices give rise to a class of unitary operators for qubits when exponentiated, called rotation operators. If the Bloch vector is to be rotated by an angle $\theta$ about the direction $\vec{n}$, the rotation operator that will do the job is

$$R_{\vec{n}}(\theta) = e^{-i\theta \vec{n} \cdot \vec{\sigma}/2}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.11)

### 2.3 Composite Systems and Entanglement

Let us now consider a system involving multiple qubits. For simplicity, we focus our attention on two qubits. If the two qubits can be treated as distinct subsystems of a larger system, the state of the combined system can then be described by a tensor product of the states of the individual subsystems. More specifically, if qubit 1 is in
state \( |\psi_1\rangle \) and qubit 2 is in state \( |\psi_2\rangle \) then the combined system is in state

\[
|\psi_{12}\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle \otimes |\psi_2\rangle = |\psi_1\psi_2\rangle
\]

where the last term shows the compact form. Any two-qubit or bipartite system that can be expressed as a product of state vectors for each subsystem is called separable.

However, if the two qubits are allowed to interact with each other, it often becomes impossible to describe each qubit separately, i.e., the state of the combined system cannot be expressed in product form. In this case, we say that the qubits are entangled. For instance, a general two-qubit state must be written as

\[
|\psi_{12}\rangle = |00\rangle \alpha + |01\rangle \beta + |10\rangle \gamma + |11\rangle \delta, \quad \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{C}
\]

This tells us that for a composite system, the state vector resides in the tensor product space of the constituent qubits. Suppose that the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2 \) of systems 1 and 2 of a bipartite system are \( M \) and \( N \), respectively. If the bipartite system is separable, the dimension of its state vector is \( M + N \), which in general is much smaller than \( MN \), the dimension of the full product space \( \mathcal{H}_1 \times \mathcal{H}_2 \). This simply means that the majority of composite quantum systems are in fact entangled states.

A general \( N \)-qubit state can then be written as

\[
|\Psi\rangle = \sum_i |i\rangle \alpha_i, \quad (2.14)
\]

where \( i \in \{0, 1\}^N \) refers to the set if all binary strings of length \( N \).

Some prominent examples of entangled states in quantum information are:

**Bell states:** \( |\Psi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle), |\Phi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle) \)

**Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ) state:** \( |GHZ\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle + |111\rangle) \)

**W state:** \( |W\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} (|100\rangle + |010\rangle + |001\rangle) \).
2.4 POVM Measurements

The quantum measurement postulate tells us two things:

1. statistics for possible measurement outcomes

2. the state of the system just after the measurement.

In a previous section, we looked at projective measurements on qubits. In general, a projective measurement is characterized by measurement operators \( \{ \Pi \} \) that are pairwise orthogonal projectors:

\[
\Pi_j \Pi_k = \Pi_j \delta_{jk},
\]

where \( \delta_{jk} \) is a Kronecker delta. If we have a system with initial state \( \rho \), the final state of the system after a von Neumann measurement can be written as

\[
\rho^{(j)} = \frac{M_j \rho M_j}{tr\{\rho \Pi_j\}}
\]

(2.15)

where \( \Pi_j = M_j^\dagger M_j \) is the measurement operator associated with the observed measurement outcome \( j \). Although simple and easy to understand, a von Neumann measurement is, in fact, usually not the best way to determine the initial state of the system. In general, what we need is a less restricted form of measurement called positive-value operator measurements or POVMs for short. Consider again a set of measurement \( \{ M_k \} \) performed on \( |\psi\rangle \). The probability \( p(m) \) of getting outcome \( m \) is given by:

\[
p(m) = \langle \psi | M_m^\dagger M_m |\psi\rangle.
\]

Define another set of operators \( E_m \):

\[
E_m = M_m^\dagger M_m.
\]
Each operator $E_m$ is a positive operator such that

$$\sum_m E_m = 1;$$

$$p(m) = \langle \psi | E_m | \psi \rangle,$$

that is, the expectation values of these operators give the probabilities for different measurement results. The operators $E_m$ describe the POVM elements and the set is called the POVM. It is the special case $E_m = \Pi_m$ correspond to von Neumann measurements.

### 2.5 Distinguishing Quantum States

Measurements are important in studying quantum systems because they provide us information about the initial state of the system. For instance, if there is complete tomography, then the initial state can be reconstructed quite accurately from measurements performed on a sufficiently large number of identical copies of the system. In particular, for qubits, the state can be determined from the expectation values of the Pauli operators $\langle X \rangle, \langle Y \rangle, \langle Z \rangle$. But measurements are also important because of another function they provide: they allow us to distinguish quantum states.

For an orthonormal set of quantum states $\{ |\psi_i \rangle \}$, the states are effectively classical so there exists a quantum measurement that will unambiguously discriminate each $|\psi_i \rangle$ from the rest. However, if any of the states are non-orthogonal, the no-cloning theorem implies that there is no way to fully distinguish them. Part of the security of quantum cryptographic schemes is because an eavesdropper cannot, in general, simply make identical copies of unknown quantum states and read off the information stored in the duplicates. This is a clear manifestation of quantum indeterminism: quantum mechanical behavior can only be described probabilistically.

Although non-orthogonal states are not fully distinguishable, we can still get some partial information from suitably designed measurements that will allow us to identify a specific state from others with high probability. In some cases, the most appropriate
measurement is characterized by a minimum probability of error in guessing the state. In fact, errors can be completely avoided at the expense of admitting inconclusive outcomes, where the measurement fails to give definite answer. For all error-free measurement schemes, the one that gives the least probability of inconclusive results is considered the optimal measurement. The problem of distinguishing quantum states then reduces to finding the optimal POVM for unambiguous discrimination of states, usually with equal a priori probability in a cryptographic setting. In general, the optimized measurement is not unique but there are theorems which can give additional optimization criteria [9]; in particular, one powerful result states that there exists an optimal solution that exhibits the same symmetry properties as the states being distinguished [10].
Bibliography


Chapter 3

Review of Information Theory

For a long time, information was thought of entirely in abstract terms. This was natural since the most common experience people had with information was when they communicated with each other. Whether in speech or writing, information seemed to be related specifically to the ideas conveyed by the words, that is to the meaning of words. Although these words may pertain to concrete, physical objects, the ideas expressed by these words are certainly abstract. The words used to express ideas inherit this abstract quality since words without meaning are of no practical use.

Words are composed of symbols, called letters or characters depending on the language. But even the same word, the same sequence of symbols, can mean different things when used in different contexts; hence it does not represent the same information all the time. So the first thing we can ask is, "how much information does a particular set of symbols contain?" Classical information theory provides us a useful means of quantifying information by giving it a precise mathematical definition, what we call information entropy.

The term entropy was borrowed from thermodynamics, and is consistent with the notion there of entropy as being a measure of the disorder in a physical system. This association with physical systems eventually led scientists to ask the following question: Is information some sort of physical quantity like energy? What they found is that this must indeed be the case for the second law of thermodynamics to be true.

If information falls under the laws of physics, then information must also obey the
laws of quantum mechanics. In studying how the framework of quantum theory fits in with the concepts of information theory, quantum information theory was developed. At the moment, quantum information theory encompasses everything we know about the physical and mathematical nature of information, and is crucial for understanding how information processing can be performed using real, physical systems. This chapter provides a brief review of information theory, with particular focus on the ideas important in quantum cryptography.

3.1 Classical Information Theory

In 1948, Claude Shannon wrote a seminal paper entitled *A Mathematical Theory of Communication* [1]. In this paper, Shannon described an efficient way for encoding information so that it can be transmitted with the minimum amount of resources. To do so, he gave a rigorous measure for information called the Shannon entropy, defined in terms of the amount of uncertainty in a given message. His work pioneered an entire field of research that was to become important in many traditional areas of study, from theoretical fields such as probability theory, statistical inference, and computer science to applied ones such as cryptography and communication networks.

The main results in classical information theory are embodied in its two most important theorems: the source compression theorem and the channel coding theorem. In many sources, they are more commonly referred to as the Shannon noiseless and noisy coding theorems, respectively. Before we can state the theorems, we first have to give precise mathematical definitions for various types of information. An excellent reference on this topic (and that of the next section) is provided by Thomas and Cover [2].

We begin with the most basic measure of information, the Shannon entropy $H$:

$$H(X) = E[\log_2(p(X))] = -\sum_x p(x) \log_2 p(x)$$

(3.1)

where $X$ is a discrete random variable, whose possible values $x$ are drawn from the probability distribution $p(x)$.
Figure 3.1: Relationships among different entropies. The diagram shows different sets pertaining to various notions of classical information (Shannon entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information) and depicts how they are related to each other.

The joint entropy $H(X, Y)$ takes a pair of random variables and gives a measure of their combined uncertainty. For two random variables $X$ and $Y$, this is defined as

$$H(X, Y) = - \sum_{x,y} p(x, y) \log p(x, y)$$

(3.2)

The conditional entropy $H(X|Y)$ gives a measure of how uncertain are we of $X$ if we know the value of $Y$,

$$H(X|Y) = H(X, Y) - H(Y)$$

(3.3)

which follows logically from the intuitive idea; since $Y$ is known, the uncertainty in $Y$ is deducted from the uncertainty of the pair to give the conditional value. The mutual information of $X$ and $Y$, $I(X : Y)$, measures how much information is contained in both
variables. This tells us that

$$I(X : Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) = H(Y) - H(Y|X) = I(Y : X)$$ (3.4)

where the use of the colon reflects the symmetric nature of the mutual information when the variables in the argument are exchanged.

The Venn diagram above in Fig. (3.1) illustrates the relation among the various entropies just defined.

When receiving messages coming from an information source, the Shannon entropy is the relevant quantity. When discussing the amount of information that can be transmitted across a communication channel between two parties, the mutual information becomes the important measure.

### 3.2 The Coding Theorems

#### 3.2.1 The Shannon source compression theorem

One of the foremost problems addressed by information theory is the issue of coding information. Information always comes from a source, and this source usually sends out information as a message taken from a particular set. There is no loss of generality if we consider the messages coming from a source to be in the form of binary digits, or bits. In this situation, a sequence of bits form a specific message. If the messages from a given source are always \( N \) bits long, how much information do we need in order to describe the source? In terms of coding, the question becomes, how many bits do we need so that we can encode for all possible messages?

A quick response would be to enumerate all possible binary digits that are \( N \) bits long. This will certainly cover all possible \( N \)-bit messages since the two sets are identical. With this trivial code, there are \( 2^N \) possible values for the message \( x \). However, *Shannon’s source coding theorem* tells us we can do better than just using directly the
3.2. The Coding Theorems

N-bit strings for coding. The theorem says that for a source $X$ of messages $x$

$$\langle L(x) \rangle \geq H(X)$$

(3.5)

where $L(x)$ is the length of a particular message $x$.

It is useful to look at the case when $N = 1$. For a single-bit source, you can only get either a 0 or a 1. Let $p$ be the probability of getting 0. According to the theorem, an ideal code to represent this particular source will have require on average

$$\langle L_{\text{ideal}} \rangle = H(p) = -p \log p - (1 - p) \log 1 - p \leq 1.$$  

(3.6)

This tells us that on average, you need less than a bit to encode for a message contained in a bit. How is this possible? Of course it is not sensible to send fractions of a bit; the ideal length is actually achieved by coding for arbitrarily long sequences of bits. For these long sequences, depending on the probability $p$, some sequence will appear far more frequently than others. These sequences are called typical sequences. Those sequences with very low probabilities are called atypical. The “savings” you obtain from the ideal code actually comes from coding only the typical sequences. This will work in most instances because atypical sequences rarely appear.

Unfortunately, the noiseless coding theorem does not tell us how to construct such an ideal code. However, it does tell us that if we can find a suitable code, we are able to compress the information from the source into fewer bits. This is why we sometimes refer to it as the source compression theorem.

Therefore, for our original source that transmits $N$-bit messages, the optimum or most efficient code will use an average of $H(X)$ bits to code for the source output. This gives entropy another interpretation: it represents a measure of the optimal resources needed to describe the information source.
3.2.2 The Shannon channel coding theorem

In the source compression theorem, we looked at a source that was free from noise. Noise can be described as random errors that appear as incorrect messages being received from a source. In a single-bit source, this means that a 0 is transmitted when a 1 was intended. Because of noise, the message transmitted from a source is not the same as the message obtained by a recipient of the message. In this case, we have to distinguish between the input and output messages—we are now dealing with a communication channel involving a sender and a receiver. Let’s use a specific example: suppose Alice wants to tell Bob some important news but he’s in a faraway location where the cellphone signal reception is bad. We are interested to know how much information can be transmitted by Alice to Bob if they use this noisy communication channel.

The diagram in Fig. (3.2) illustrates the situation we are looking at here. Alice wishes to send a message $M$ to Bob using a noisy channel. To do so, she encodes the messages into an input string $X$. She sends the string through the channel to Bob who receives an output string $Y$. If the channel were noise-free, string $Y$ would be exactly the same as string $X$. In general, there will be some noise in the channel so they won’t be the same. Bob decodes the output string to read off the message $M'$. For small amounts of noise, the received message $M'$ will be close to the original message $M$ sent by Alice. How close they will be depends on how reliable the transmission is over the channel. The amount of information that can be reliably transmitted in the channel is called the channel capacity.

It is not obvious how to obtain the capacity of a particular channel since this seems to involve examining infinitely many ways of encoding and decoding and looking for the one which gives the maximum amount of information. To be more precise, what Alice sends are messages from a particular set. For each possible message, she performs an encoding that can be corrected for errors, and the resulting string serves as the channel input. This means input $X$ is really described by a random variable with probability distribution $p(x)$, where $x$ is an element from the set of all possible input strings. The same goes for output $Y$ on Bob’s side. The problem becomes finding the ideal code for
3.2. The Coding Theorems

Figure 3.2: Schematic for a noisy communication channel. If Alice wants to send a message $M$ to Bob through a noisy channel, Bob in general receives a different message $M'$. For sufficiently low noise, there exists an error-correcting code such that Alice can encode $M$ as $X$, transmit it through the noisy channel where Bob obtains $Y$ that he can reliably decode so that $M = M'$.

the channel such that the correlation between $X$ and $Y$ is maximized.

However, Shannon’s noisy coding theorem simplifies the problem immensely by showing that the problem reduces to optimizing the mutual information between the channel input and output. Shannon was able to show with the aid of a random-coding argument that for any noisy channel, the channel capacity $C$ can be defined to be

$$C = \max_{p(x)} I(X : Y)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.7)

where the maximum is taken over all input distributions $p(x)$ for $X$.

The channel capacity $C$ tells us the maximum rate at which information can be transmitted through the communication channel. The amount of information trans-
mitted across the channel for every symbol used is called the information rate. If the information rate $R$ is less than $C$, the theorem implies that you can reach arbitrarily small error probabilities by using smart coding techniques. This will involve coding for longer blocks of data but the point is that this is possible as long as $R < C$. When $R > C$, the errors cannot be avoided regardless of which code you use.

### 3.3 Quantum Information Theory

Information expressed in terms of bits is classical. A classical bit is generally a macroscopic object where a certain parameter is designated as the information carrier. For example, two well-separated ranges of voltages can be used to represent 0 and 1. A quantum bit, in contrast, is typically carried by a microscopic system such as an atom, electron spin, or photon. A fixed pair of distinguishable states can represent the classical states 0 and 1. A qubit, however, can also exist in a continuum of intermediate states called superpositions, represented as complex linear combinations of the basis states $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$. Similar to bits, qubits can also be treated as information. However, in this case we need a more general treatment than what Shannon has provided because superpositions states do not exist for classical information. This leads us to quantum generalizations of classical information-theoretic concepts.

For a classical probability distribution, Shannon entropy measures the uncertainty associated with the random variable. If we replace the distribution with density operators for quantum states, we use a different information measure called the von Neumann entropy. It is defined as

$$S(\rho) = -\text{tr}\{\rho \log_2 \rho\}. \quad (3.8)$$

If $\lambda_i$ are the eigenvalues of $\rho$, that is we can write the density operator as

$$\rho = \sum_i |i\rangle \lambda_i \langle i|, \quad (3.9)$$
where \{ |i\rangle, i = 1, 2, \ldots \} is a basis for which \( \rho \) is diagonal, then

\[
S(\rho) = -\sum_i \lambda_i \log(\lambda_i).
\]  

(3.10)

Some important properties of the von Neumann entropy are given below:

1. \( S(\rho) \geq 0. \)

2. If \( \dim(\mathcal{H}) = d \) then \( S(\rho) \leq \log_2(d) \) with equality if and only if \( \rho = 1/d. \)

3. If \( \rho_i \) are states with probability \( p_i \) then \( S(\sum_i p_i \rho_i) = H(p_i) + \sum_i p_i S(\rho_i). \)

4. \( S(\sum_i p_i \rho_i) \geq \sum_i p_i S(\rho_i). \)

The last property is called concavity. A profound understanding of some of the results of quantum information theory that we’ll explore later on hinges on the fact that entropy is a concave function of its inputs. Intuitively, we can think of the uncertainty of the state \( \rho = \sum_i p_i \rho_i \) is larger than the average uncertainty for the states \( \rho_i \) because we are also ignorant of the index \( i. \)

Analogous to the Shannon entropy, we can define the joint and conditional von Neumann entropies and the quantum mutual information:

\[
S(A|B) = S(A, B) - S(B)
\]

\[
I_q(A : B) = S(A) + S(B) - S(A, B)
\]

(3.11)

3.3.1 Schumacher’s source compression theorem

We are now ready to state the quantum versions of the classical coding theorems given above. First we look at the source compression theorem. For quantum systems, the Shannon entropy is insufficient because in general quantum states are not perfectly distinguishable. The quantum analogue of Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem was found by Schumacher essentially by substituting von Neumann entropy for Shannon entropy: the von Neumann entropy of a quantum source specifies the minimum asymptotic num-
ber of qubits needed to compress a signal by some encoding process and still be faithfully
recovered by a corresponding decoding process.

Suppose a quantum source that emits signals that can be described by the density
operator
\[
\rho = \sum_x |x\rangle p(x) \langle x|, \tag{3.12}
\]
where the set of states \{\ket{x}\} is not necessarily an orthonormal set. If \{\ket{x}\} is orthonormal
then \(p(x)\) gives the eigenvalues of \(\rho\). If we imagine the signal being sent through a channel
and comes out as \(\rho'\) after measurement on the other side, then we can define the fidelity
\(F^1\) as
\[
F = \sum_x p(x) \langle x|\rho'|x\rangle. \tag{3.13}
\]
The fidelity indicates how much \(\rho\) and \(\rho'\) match: it is unity only in the case of perfect
transmission. Schumacher’s compression theorem can now be stated as follows:

**Theorem (Schumacher):** Suppose we have a quantum source signal with signal ensemble
described by \(\rho\). Let \(\delta, \epsilon > 0\). (i) If \(S(\rho) + \delta\) qubits are used per signal, then for sufficiently
large \(N\), there is a coding scheme for strings of length \(N\) such that \(F > 1 - \epsilon\), and (ii) If
\(S(\rho) - \delta\) qubits are used per signal, then for whatever coding scheme, strings of length
\(N\) will be decoded with \(F < \epsilon\) for large enough \(N\).

The result is clearly analogous to the classical theorem: in fact, you can retrieve
Shannon’s source compression theorem if the signal ensemble has orthonormal states.
Proofs of the theorem can be found in different references but the gist of most of them
follows the classical proof but replaces the idea of typical sequences with the somewhat
analogous idea of typical subspaces. A typical state is the state defined by a particular
typical sequence: if \(x_1, x_2, ..., x_N\) is a typical sequence then \(\ket{x_1, x_2, ..., x_N}\) describes a
typical multi-qubit state. The typical subspace is the subspace spanned by all typical
states. Similar to the classical version, the quantum version works because signals from

---

\footnote{This notion is different from the standard one for fidelity as a measure of the distance between quantum states. Conventionally, the fidelity of states \(\rho\) and \(\sigma\) is defined as
\[
F(\rho, \sigma) \equiv \text{tr}\{\sqrt{\sqrt{\rho} \sigma \sqrt{\rho}}\}.\]
the atypical subspace are rarely obtained from the quantum source.

3.3.2 Accessible Information about Quantum States

In this project, we are interested primarily in the problem of transmitting classical information through a noisy quantum channel. This is a test on the security of the scheme if we pretend that all errors from the channel are due to an eavesdropper. In an earlier section, we saw Shannon’s theorem for classical channels

\[ C = \max_{p(x)} \{ I(X : Y) \}, \]

with the maximum taken over all input distributions \( \{ p(x) \} \) for \( X \). What we want to find is the classical information capacity for noisy quantum channels, usually denoted as \( C_1 \). The subscript is important because quantum channels have different capacities depending on how it is utilized; for example, there is a quantum capacity for how much quantum information can be transmitted through the quantum channel.

Let’s use the following scenario: Alice sends quantum states to Bob one at a time. Bob wishes to perform measurements on those states to figure out what Alice has sent. Quantum laws prohibit Bob from obtaining complete knowledge of the state he receives but he can choose his measurements in a clever way so that he can gather as much information as he is allowed by physical laws. The problem then is really maximizing Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s prepared states. This is quantified by what we call the accessible information. If we denote Alice’s ensemble of quantum states by \( A \) and Bob’s POVM by \( B \), the accessible information for Bob about Alice’s states is given by

\[ I_{\text{acc}}(A) = \max_{\text{all } B} \{ I(A : B) \}, \]  

(3.14)

where the mutual information is maximized over all possible measurement schemes Bob can perform. Looking at the equation, it looks very similar to the classical channel capacity, which seems to suggest that the corresponding capacity for quantum channels will involve the accessible information.
Accessible information is a less important concept in classical information theory because classical states are in principle perfectly distinguishable. It doesn’t mean that the measurement to distinguish different classical states is always easy but you know that there is a way to do it perfectly. The concept is a lot more useful for quantum information because, as we have seen previously, non-orthogonal quantum states are not fully distinguishable. In quantum cryptography, the accessible information for an eavesdropper Eve determines the security of the key distributed between Alice and Bob over a quantum channel.

3.3.3 The Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland (HSW) Theorem

The next thing we want to know is, how do you find the accessible information for a given quantum channel? In fact, the problem is a difficult one because the optimization needed for computing $I_{\text{acc}}$ requires searching for the optimal POVM (at least one if there are many) such that the mutual information is equal to $I_{\text{acc}}$. But there are infinitely many ways to do the measurement and there is no general strategy for determining which is the optimal one. However, there are a number of theorems (one particularly useful theorem about the number of outcomes for the optimal POVM is due to Davies [5]) and numerical methods (an example is the steepest-ascent iterative procedure of Řeháček, Englert and Kaszlikowski [3] that led to the SOMIM program [4]) available to help us find an optimum POVM. In this section, we look at one particular result: an upper bound on the value of the accessible information. This quantity is usually denoted by $\chi$ and is called the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland bound (often just Holevo bound).

Suppose that Alice prepares a state $\rho_x$ taken from an ensemble $\{\rho_x : x = 0, 1, ..., N\}$ with probabilities $p_0, p_1, ..., p_N$. Bob performs a measurement described by a POVM $\{\Pi_y : y = 0, 1, ..., M\}$ to figure out which state Alice has sent. For whatever measurement Bob chooses to do, Holevo [6], Schumacher and Westmoreland [7] proved that the mutual
information between Alice’s input $X$ and Bob’s output $Y$ is bounded by

$$I(X : Y) \leq S(\rho) - \sum_x p_x S(\rho_x) = \chi(\rho) \tag{3.15}$$

where $\rho = p_x \rho_x$ is the statistical operator describing Alice’s signals. Since $\chi(\rho)$ is an upper bound on the mutual information,

$$I_{\text{acc}}(X) \leq \chi(\rho), \tag{3.16}$$

that is, the Holevo bound sets the upper limit for the accessible information. The bound is not tight because the equality holds if and only if $\rho_j \rho_k = \rho_k \rho_j$ for all $j, k$, and this hardly ever happens.

### 3.4 Information-Theoretic Notions of Security

Whenever we talk about cryptographic security, it is implicit that the mechanics of the protocol is known to all; security must not in any way depend on the secrecy of the scheme. A cryptographic scheme is said to be breakable if Eve can recover the original message from the cipher without prior knowledge of the key. In classical information theory, the condition is relaxed in practice so that the code is not in principle unbreakable, but cracking the code would take an impractical amount of time [8]. There are three common ways of evaluating cryptographic security:

1. **Unconditional security** — This is the highest standard for security. Eve is given unlimited computational resources in attacking the scheme. In classical information theory, the only limit is information is purely classical in nature. In QKD, the restrictions are set by the laws of physics.

2. **Complexity-based security** — This is the common, practical standard for security. In this case, we consider the computational cost for Eve to break the system. If the most efficient known attack takes an exponential amount of time or memory space for calculation, the scheme is deemed secure.
3. **Provable security** — This is the theoretical approach for establishing security.

We examine how much information Eve can acquire from attacking the scheme subject to well-defined, reasonable mathematical assumptions expressed mostly in information-theoretic terms. Both earlier methods of evaluation use some elements of proof of this kind.

In classical information theory, there is an important theorem regarding broadcast channels with confidential messages. This communication network corresponds exactly to Alice sending information to both Bob and Eve. In a cryptographic setting, we want Bob's channel to be private; there should be no leakage to Eve. Csiszár and Körner published a significant result [9] which states that the optimal amount of secure information that can be transmitted to Bob is given by the difference between the mutual information between Alice and Bob $I(A : B)$ and the mutual information between Alice and Eve $I(A : E)$. We sometimes call this amount of private information the C-K yield or ‘wiretapper’ bound.

For the double trine scheme, the keys are generated from quantum states but the key retrieved by Alice and Bob is entirely classical. In this regard, we may still use the C-K yield as a measure of security but we have to supplement it with several key results for the accessible information about quantum states. This is where the HSW theorem comes in, for the HSW bound specifies the maximum amount of mutual information available to Eve for a particular level of noise in the channel. (Eve may only eavesdrop if she can somehow pretend to act like noise.) In tandem, we can establish information-theoretic formulas for the private classical capacity of a quantum channel [10].
Bibliography


Chapter 4

Trine-Based Protocols

In QKD, mutually non-orthogonal states are important because such states cannot be completely discriminated from each other. This property of quantum states is a consequence of a fundamental result in quantum mechanics, the no-cloning theorem [1]. According to the theorem, creating identical copies of an arbitrary quantum state while keeping the original state intact is expressly forbidden by the laws of quantum mechanics. A simple proof of the theorem involves envisioning a copying machine in the form of a linear (in fact unitary) operator. Using linear superposition of quantum states, one finds that the cloning machine is successful only if it is used to generate copies of a single state or a set of orthogonal states (as in the case of classical bits). Because possible quantum states include superpositions of orthogonal states in general, the machine will not work for any arbitrary quantum state.

Because of the impossibility of duplicating an unknown quantum state exactly, quantum states serve as ideal signals for crytography, since physical laws themselves prohibit a potential eavesdropper from simply making a copy of the transmitted message. For qubits, a three-state or trine system represents the simplest set of mutually non-orthogonal states. One of the earliest attempts to describe three-state protocols was done by Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Peres [2]. A family of trine-based protocols, derived from the B92 protocol [5] by adding a third state, was then introduced by Phoenix, Barnett, and Chefles [3] with its unconditional security subsequently proven by Boileau et al. [4]. In this chapter, we discuss cryptographic schemes based on qubit trines.
4.1 A Standard Trine Scheme

Consider states that can be represented by three real vectors on a plane with each adjacent pair separated by 120 degrees. Such a set of mutually non-orthogonal, symmetric states forms a geometric representation for the qubit trine. The diagram below (Fig. (4.1)) shows a conventional choice for the trine states, where one of the vectors points in the positive x-direction.

Figure 4.1: Geometric representation for the qubit trine. The vectors depict the traditional choice for a normalized trine: $(1, 0), 1/2(-1, -\sqrt{3}), 1/2(-1, \sqrt{3})$.

In describing the standard trine-based scheme, it is expedient for us to also label the vectors directed opposite the designated trine states, which here we refer to as the antitrine states. We call them $A', B', \text{ and } C'$ so that corresponding primed and unprimed states are antiparallel vectors in the geometric picture (Fig. (4.2)).

As a description of quantum states, the trine states can be interpreted as ternary symmetric Bloch vectors on a planar slice of the Bloch sphere. The plane is usually taken to be the $XZ$-plane. Recall that in the Bloch representation of qubits, orthogonal
states are associated with antiparallel vectors in the Bloch sphere. Thus, for the case of the trine, A and A’ describe orthogonal qubits; the same goes for the pairs \{B,B’\} and \{C,C’\}. In the discussion that follows, it is not important which plane of the Bloch sphere is used although it is conventional to choose the plane with no relative phase, i.e. \( \phi = 0 \).

We are now ready to describe the protocol. Following cryptographic tradition, we call our communicating parties Alice and Bob. Alice prepares her qubits in any one of the states belonging to the trine, with equal probability, and sends the qubits one at a time to Bob. Meanwhile, Bob attempts to measure the state of each qubit he receives from Alice using a detector with settings for the antitrine states\(^1\). As a result, if Alice sends Bob say a signal for state A, Bob will register detector clicks only if the detector is switched for state B’ or C’.

\(^1\)The antitrine POVM maximizes the mutual information about the prepared trine states
he receives using projectors for the trine states, denoted by $A, B,$ and $C,$ respectively.
Instead, Bob uses the projectors for the antritrine states, known as the complementary
projectors since the sum of the a projector and its complement is equal to the identity
(e.g., $A + A' = 1$).

Let $P(i,j)$ correspond to the marginal probability of Alice sending a qubit in state
$i$ and Bob measuring the same qubit in state $j$. We can then define

$$P(i,*) = \sum_{k=1}^{3} P(i,k)$$

(4.1)
as the probability for Alice’s qubit to be in state $i$ and

$$P(*,j) = \sum_{l=1}^{3} P(l,j)$$

(4.2)as the probability for Bob to measure the qubit in state $j$. For example, if Alice selects
the state of the qubits randomly, then $P(i,*) = 1/3$. If there are no correlations between
the state of the qubit that Alice prepares and the measurement result obtained by Bob
for that qubit, then $P(i,j) = P(i,*)P(*,j)$, as expected.

To simplify the description of the scheme, we can drop the distinction between
primed and unprimed states and treat them as identical. Thus, what Alice calls $A$ and
what Bob calls $A'$ we will now refer to as “state $A$”. (For now we know that Alice
and Bob refer to two different state $A$’s but later on we will see that it is possible to
implement the scheme such that Alice and Bob refer to just one set of trine states.) In
this language, the results of the trine scheme is summarized by the marginal probability
matrix in Table (4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Bob</th>
<th>$P(i,*)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$C$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Probability matrix for the standard trine protocol

In reality, Bob will not be making projective measurements because this is rather
inefficient; a third of the states sent by Alice will register a null measurement if Bob
switches his detector settings randomly among the antitrine directions. Instead, Bob
performs a generalized measurement called a POVM (which he can do because Alice
prepares quantum signals, not classical ones). Using a POVM, every state that Alice
sends will register a click but in such a way that a qubit A will never give Bob a
measurement result for state A.

Using the probability table above, we can compute the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob. Roughly speaking, the mutual information of two random variables
tells us the information about one variable if you know the value of the other variable.
For the trine scheme, we get

\[
I = \sum_{j,k} P(j,k) \log_2 \left( \frac{P(j,k)}{P(j,*)P(*,k)} \right) = 6 \frac{1}{6} \log_2 \left( \frac{1/6}{1/9} \right) = \log_2 \left( \frac{3}{2} \right) \approx 0.585. \quad (4.3)
\]

Therefore, 0.585 bits is the maximum average number of bits that can be transmitted
through the channel. The remaining task is to find an efficient procedure for extracting
a key that approaches this limit as close as possible.

4.2 Generating the Key

4.2.1 The method of PBC00

As mentioned earlier, the standard trine scheme follows closely from the three-state
protocol proposed by Phoenix, Barnett, and Chefles, what we refer to as PBC00. Here
we describe how the key is established from that scheme.

To be more specific, we briefly recall how PBC00 works. Alice randomly sends
quantum signals with equal a priori probability from the trine set \{ |A⟩, |B⟩, |C⟩ \}. Let
A,B,C be the corresponding projectors for the respective trine states and A’,B’,C’
be the corresponding complementary projectors. Bob measures the states he receives
from Alice using the complementary projectors. For those instances when Bob is able
to measure the state Alice has prepared, they get a matching pair of letters. At the
end of the transmission, Alice and Bob will have recorded a sequence of letters of the
same length, matched according to the timeslots they are sent or received. When the transmission is finished, Alice and Bob can confer in a public channel in order to generate the key.

Before moving along, Bob informs Alice of the timeslots with null or empty results so that these timeslots can be discarded. From those that remain, let us suppose that Alice chooses a particular timeslot where she had sent the state $|A\rangle$. Alice then informs Bob one of the two states she didn’t send to him. For example, Alice tells Bob it was not $|C\rangle$. If, according to his record, Bob had measured using $B'$, he will determine for certain that Alice sent him state $|A\rangle$. If she told him she didn’t send $|B\rangle$, he will learn nothing and so they simply discard this pair. Since there is an equal chance for Alice to announce B or C, the key generation scheme uses on average 50% of the bits recorded.

Finally, Alice and Bob will take note of the state that has been prepared and the state she announced as not the one sent. In this example, the pair is AC. We use a cyclic convention to write down the corresponding bit. Whenever we have AB, BC, or CA, we write down ‘0’. If we have BA, CB, or AC, we write down ‘1’. Alice and Bob will agree on which bit they record because both know the state prepared and the announced state that wasn’t sent. In this case, they will both jot down ‘1’.

Table (4.2) shows the steps involved in a typical PBC00 transmission process using sample results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice prepares</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bob measures</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measured?(Y/N)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice tells not</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair order</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>CB</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>BC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded bit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: An example illustrating the PBC00 transmission processes

### 4.2.2 A two-alphabet key generation procedure

For the double trine scheme we use a different procedure for extracting the key. This key generation scheme is due to Chua [6] and results in a dual key of bits and trits.
4.2. Generating the Key

Again, we start with Alice choosing at random which of the trine states to prepare and sends it to Bob. Bob performs his measurement for the anti-trine states for the signals Alice has prepared. They record in chronological order the states sent and detected. After the transmission, they end up with a long, random, sequential string of As, Bs, and Cs. At this stage Alice and Bob are ready to produce the key.

To facilitate the discussion on how the key is generated, we use a short sample of the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like most quantum schemes, Alice and Bob produce a key by discussing over a public channel. Alice chooses two positions from her record that have different symbols. For example, she chooses positions 2 and 8 of the sample data. In this instance, Alice has the ordered pair BC while Bob has the pair AA. Bob will then inform Alice that he has the same letter for the positions indicated. Alice should immediately identify this letter to be A since it is the only symbol compatible with the pair she has prepared for those positions. Therefore, Alice and Bob writes down a A for the key. Because there are three possible outcomes, we call the situation a trit case and the corresponding symbol a part of the trit key. The positions used are then discarded from further use.

For the next round, let us suppose that Alice chooses positions 3 and 10. Referring to the sample data once more, Alice has AB while Bob has CA. In this instance, Bob reveals to Alice the symbols he has but he doesn’t say in which order they appear. He simply announces that AC corresponds to a ‘0’ and CA corresponds to a ‘1’ (which bit is assigned to which order can be chosen at random or one may follow a convention similar to PBC00). A quick peek at her record will tell Alice that the correct order is CA since Bob couldn’t have detected an A for the state A she prepared for the first symbol of the pair. They will agree in writing down 1. Since they write down 0s and 1s on this situation, we call it the bit case and the resulting strings of bits will be the bit key.

Let us briefly examine the security of the key extraction procedure. We allow Eve to listen in on Alice and Bob’s conversation. When they are discussing a trit case, all that
Eve knows is Bob has the same letter but after that she has to guess which of the three possibilities A, B, or C it could be. She has a mere \( \frac{1}{3} \) chance of guessing correctly. On the other hand, if they are dealing with a bit case, Eve knows about the two particular letters that Bob has but she doesn’t know the order in which they come. She again has to guess the order blindly and she will be right only half of the time in guessing if Alice and Bob record a 0 or 1.

As Alice and Bob compare more pairs of symbols from their transmission records, the probability that Eve obtains the same sequence for the key becomes increasingly small. To calculate this we need to know the probability for getting a trit case or a bit case. For any given pair that Alice selects, say AB, there will be four compatible outcomes for Bob (in this example, these are BA, BC, CA, and CC). Only one of the outcomes will correspond to a trit case. Therefore, if Alice and Bob used \( N \) pairs of letters for the key, then the probability that Eve has the same key is given by

\[
\left[ \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1}{3} \right) + \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \right]^N = \frac{11}{24}^N. \tag{4.4}
\]

Any pair of unlike letters that Alice chooses from her transmission record will contribute a symbol to either the bit key or the trit key. Assuming Alice and Bob exhaust all the letters in their transmission records, we can calculate the amount of information each of them can extract from every symbol they use for generating the key. We treat the trit and bit cases separately since the two keys are formed independently.

For the trit case, its probability of occurrence is \( \frac{1}{4} \). The contribution of the trit case to the mutual information is then given by

\[
I_{\text{trit}} = \frac{1}{4} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2(3) \right], \tag{4.5}
\]

where the \( \frac{1}{2} \) comes from the fact that obtaining a letter for the key involves two positions in the sequence and the \( \log_2(3) \) is the entropy for having three possible outcomes (A,B,C).
Similarly for the bit case we have

\[ I_{\text{bit}} = \frac{3}{4} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) \right] \] (4.6)

since in this instance, the probability of a bit case is \( \frac{3}{4} \) and there are only two possible outcomes, 0 and 1.

Thus, the average mutual information when both cases are combined is

\[ I = \frac{1}{4} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2(3) \right] + \frac{3}{4} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2(2) \right] \]
\[ = \frac{1}{8} \log_2(3) + \frac{3}{8} \approx 0.573. \]

This represents 98% of the maximum possible mutual information that can be transmitted using a trine-based scheme.

### 4.3 Statistics with Noise

So far we have assumed that we have a noiseless quantum communication channel. In practice, there will be some error present. We now account for noise in the system since this will be the more relevant analysis in actual practical implementations of the above scheme and its latter version to be introduced later. The noise is characterized by a parameter \( \epsilon \), where \( 0 \leq \epsilon \leq 1 \). The presence of a small amount of noise allows for a minute possibility that Bob gets the same letter that Alice sends. The net outcome for the noisy channel is summarised by the probability matrix in Table (4.3). Note that if \( \epsilon = 0 \) we recover the noiseless channel. If \( \epsilon = 1 \), all event probabilities become equally likely so any correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s string of letters vanishes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bob</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P(i)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>( \epsilon/9 )</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( \epsilon/9 )</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( (3-\epsilon)/18 )</td>
<td>( \epsilon/9 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(j)</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3} )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Probability matrix for the trine scheme using a noisy channel
Chapter 4. Trine-Based Protocols

If Alice and Bob use quantum states for the noisy trine scheme, they can ensure themselves of such a symmetric joint probability table by ‘twirling’\(^2\) a shared source of two-qubit mixed states (like the one used for the E91 protocol described in Chapter 1) so that they receive an unbiased noise state

\[
\rho_{AB} = (1 - \epsilon)\lvert \Phi^- \rangle \langle \Phi^- \rvert + \frac{\epsilon}{4},
\]

where \( \lvert \Phi^- \rangle \) refers to the singlet state.

Let us study the statistics of the key that Alice and Bob produces. Without loss of generality,\(^3\) let us consider the particular scenario where Alice chooses a (B,C) pair from her sequence of letters. Bob now has nine different possible outcomes with unequal probabilities. These probabilities can be computed using

\[
P(F|G) = \frac{P(F \cap G)}{P(G)},
\]

where \( F \) and \( G \) refer to instances of letters from the set \{A, B, C\} and noting that each letter occurs independent of the others. There are four events compatible to Alice’s pair. These are \{(A,B), (A,A), (C,A), (C,B)\} and they occur with probability \((3 - \epsilon)^2/36\). For the event when Bob also gets (B,C), the probability is \(\epsilon^2/9\). All remaining events \{(B,B),(C,C),(A,C),(B,A)\} have probability \(\epsilon(3 - \epsilon)/36\). First we treat the trit case. This happens when Bob gets either (A,A), (B,B), or (C,C). From the above probabilities, we compute that the probability of getting a trit case is given by

\[
P(\text{trit case}) = P((A, A)) + P((B, B)) + P((C, C)) = \frac{(3 - \epsilon)^2}{36} + 2\frac{(3 - \epsilon)\epsilon}{18} = \frac{(3 - \epsilon)(1 + \epsilon)}{12}.
\]

\(^2\)The twirl operation is a preprocessing step used in many entanglement purification protocols which converts an arbitrary mixed state of a two-qubit system into the Werner state \(\rho_{AB}\). The idea behind twirling is that the singlet state is invariant under bilateral unitary transformations of two qubits (that is, identical single-qubit, local unitaries are applied to the pair of qubits). Choosing a suitable sequence of random bilateral rotations averages out other states while preserving the singlet.

\(^3\)All other situations can be accounted for by a cyclic permutation of the letters A,B, and C.
4.3. Statistics with Noise

We are ready to calculate the probabilities associated with Alice and Bob writing down various pairs of letters in their key. Without noise, we expect Alice and Bob’s corresponding letters to always agree but with some noise, some errors are unwittingly introduced. Let us summarize these probabilities in a table where diagonal entries refer to the instances when they agree and off-diagonal entries refer to the instances when they disagree.

If Bob announces they have a trit case, they should agree to write down A. But with noise it is possible for Bob to actually hold a pair of Bs or Cs and so in such a case they will write down different letters for the key. For the trit case, Alice and Bob’s keys are thus correlated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A  B  C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>\frac{3-\epsilon}{9} \frac{\epsilon}{9+\epsilon} \frac{2}{9+\epsilon} \frac{1}{3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>\frac{2}{9+\epsilon} \frac{\epsilon}{9+\epsilon} \frac{3-\epsilon}{9+\epsilon} \frac{2}{9+\epsilon} \frac{1}{3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>\frac{2}{9+\epsilon} \frac{\epsilon}{9+\epsilon} \frac{1}{9+\epsilon} \frac{3}{9+\epsilon} \frac{1}{3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{3} 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that when there is no noise (\(\epsilon = 0\)), the diagonal entries become 1/3 while the off-diagonal entries become zero, as they should.

Let’s move on to the bit case. In the situation described above, this happens whenever Bob doesn’t get the same letter twice, with probabilities given conditioned on what corresponding letters Alice hold (in this case the pair (B,C)). Adding the remaining probabilities, we get

\[
P(\text{bit case}) = P(A, B) + P(C, A) + P(C, B) + P(B, C) + P(A, C) + P(B, A)
= 3 \frac{(3 - \epsilon)^2}{36} + \frac{\epsilon^2}{9} + 2 \frac{(3 - \epsilon)\epsilon}{18}
= 9 - 2\epsilon + \frac{\epsilon^2}{12}.
\]

If Bob announces a bit case, he then makes a random assignment of 0 and 1 to the two different orderings of his pair of letters. With Alice’s (B,C), the only compatible results are (A,B), (C,A), and (C, B). Since Bob tells Alice the orderings, only one of
these three results are considered at any one time but in a noisy quantum channel it is possible for Alice to write 1 while Bob writes down 0, and vice-versa. In calculating the correlation between Alice and Bob’s bit key, we can simply consider each of the compatible cases separately and add the probabilities for agreement and disagreement between Alice and Bob. For the bit case, the table then looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2ε/9−2ε+ε²</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ε/9−2ε+ε²</td>
<td>(3−ε)²/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ε/9−2ε+ε²</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculating the mutual information between Alice and Bob in the trit and bit cases, respectively, yield

\[
I(A : B \mid \text{trit}) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{4}{3} \left( \frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon} \right) \log_2 \frac{2\epsilon}{1+\epsilon} + \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{3-\epsilon}{1+\epsilon} \right) \log_2 \frac{3-\epsilon}{1+\epsilon} \right], \tag{4.10}
\]

\[
I(A : B \mid \text{bit}) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{4\epsilon}{9-2\epsilon+\epsilon^2} \log_2 \frac{8\epsilon}{9-2\epsilon+\epsilon^2} + \frac{(3-\epsilon)^2}{9-2\epsilon+\epsilon^2} \log_2 \frac{2(3-\epsilon)^2}{9-2\epsilon+\epsilon^2} \right].
\]

Plots of the mutual information in both cases are depicted in Fig. (4.3).

Figure 4.3: Mutual information between Alice and Bob in the noisy bit and trit cases of a typical trine scheme.
Bibliography


Chapter 5

The Double Trine Scheme

It is generally presumed that communicating parties share a reference frame, whose precise nature depends on the particular information carriers involved [1]. Such an assumption is done implicitly just as quantum states are defined with respect to a suitable reference frame. However, to implement most of the key distribution schemes available, Alice and Bob have to establish beforehand this particular reference frame on which they will base their measurements, sometimes a difficult task to accomplish.

No shared reference frame means a lack of knowledge about the isomorphism between local operations of Alice and Bob [2]. Without a shared reference frame, it is impossible for Alice to communicate any information using a single qubit. This is because the information encoded on a physical qubit can only be accessed properly if the reference frame in which it was defined is known to the experimenter. When using an optical fiber for transmitting polarized photons, for example, Bob typically has no knowledge of the relationship between Alice’s polarization axes and his own. They can only proceed in their communication task if they agree on which are the horizontal and vertical axes of the polarization, something that can be determined with by measuring the orientation of a sufficient number of strong laser pulses.

However, if Alice transmits two or more qubits, it is possible to send some information because the relative state of the qubits carries information independent of a reference frame. In the double trine scheme, the qubits for the trine are constructed from three physical qubits, configured in such a way that the states can be distinguished from each
other independent of the choice of a reference frame. We study the main features of the double trine scheme in detail in this chapter.

It is worth noting that lack of a shared reference frame can be treated as a form of decoherence [3]. Techniques involving decoherence free subspaces can then be used to find quantum states that are immune to this kind of noise [4, 5].

5.1 Constructing the Double Trine States

The rotationally invariant double trine QKD scheme is an example of quantum communication which does not require a shared reference frame. In this basis-independent scheme, a logical qubit is constructed from three physical qubits. For our purposes, it is sufficient to consider an entangled trio of spin-1/2 particles. In this case, we get two different sets of trines in orthogonal subspaces:

For the subspace \((j = \frac{1}{2}, m = \frac{1}{2})\) :

\[
\begin{align*}
|a_1\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle - |\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle), \\
|a_2\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\rangle - |\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle), \\
|a_3\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle).
\end{align*}
\] (5.1)

For the subspace \((j = \frac{1}{2}, m = -\frac{1}{2})\) :

\[
\begin{align*}
|b_1\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle), \\
|b_2\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle - |\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle), \\
|b_3\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\rangle).
\end{align*}
\] (5.2)

Because the scheme uses two independent sets of trines, we refer to it simply as the double trine scheme. For ease of reference, let us call the set \(|a_i\rangle\) the a-states and the set \(|b_i\rangle\) the b-states. It is useful to note some general properties of these
5.1. Constructing the Double Trine States

states \((i, j = 1, 2, 3)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle a_i | a_j \rangle &= \frac{3}{2} \delta_{ij} - \frac{1}{2}, \\
\langle b_i | b_j \rangle &= \frac{3}{2} \delta_{ij} - \frac{1}{2}, \\
\langle a_i | b_j \rangle &= 0.
\end{align*}
\] (5.3)

Now we are ready to construct the states for the double trine scheme. Observe that the \(a\)- and \(b\)-states consist of an up or down spin entangled with a singlet. Here it is useful to consider the projector for the singlet:

\[
|\Phi^-\rangle \langle \Phi^-| = \frac{1}{2} (|↑↓⟩⟨↑↓| - |↑↓⟩⟨↓↑| - |↓↑⟩⟨↑↓| + |↓↑⟩⟨↓↑|) (5.4)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(1)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(2)}).
\]

If we attach an up or down spin to a singlet, the projector to such a state will be given by

\[
|\Phi^- \uparrow_3⟩ ⟨\Phi^- \uparrow_3| = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(1)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(2)}) \frac{1}{2} (1 + \sigma^{(3)}_z),
\] (5.5)

\[
|\Phi^- \downarrow_3⟩ ⟨\Phi^- \downarrow_3| = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(1)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(2)}) \frac{1}{2} (1 - \sigma^{(3)}_z).
\]

The other two pairs of projectors are obtained by a cyclic permutation of the labels 1, 2, 3. Notice that if we add these pairs of projectors, we end up with three projectors that constitute another trine. Furthermore, these trine projectors form a rotationally invariant set since they are constructed from a singlet and a noisy qubit (which is what you get from an even mixture of an up and down spin). The states that Alice sends to Bob are obtained from these equal mixtures of corresponding \(a\)- and \(b\)-states:

\[
S_1 = |a_1⟩ ⟨a_1| + |b_1⟩ ⟨b_1| = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(2)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(3)}),
\] (5.6)

\[
S_2 = |a_2⟩ ⟨a_2| + |b_2⟩ ⟨b_2| = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(3)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(1)}),
\]

\[
S_3 = |a_3⟩ ⟨a_3| + |b_3⟩ ⟨b_3| = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \vec{σ}^{(1)} \cdot \vec{σ}^{(2)}).
\]
It is worth noting that this construction is a special case of a more general symmetric scheme for encoding reference-frame-free logical qudits [6], achieved by coupling spin-1/2 particles and done here for \( d = 2 \) (i.e., to get rotationally invariant qubits).

It becomes straightforward to write down the statistical operator for Alice’s states in terms of \( S_1, S_2 \) and \( S_3 \):

\[
\rho_1 = \frac{1}{2} S_1, \quad \rho_2 = \frac{1}{2} S_2, \quad \rho_3 = \frac{1}{2} S_3.
\]

We likewise can express Bob’s POVM in terms of the same projectors. Note that the elements of this POVM must satisfy the following properties:

\[
\Pi_1 + \Pi_2 + \Pi_3 = 1 \quad \text{(in } j = 1/2) \tag{5.7}
\]

\[
\text{tr}\{\rho_j \Pi_k\} = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \delta_{jk}).
\]

The first condition states that the POVM elements must form a decomposition of the identity in the \( j = 1/2 \) sector of the eight-dimensional Hilbert space of the three qubits, which is appropriate here because all double trine states reside in this particular subspace. The second condition enforces the conventional rule for detecting the trine states: if Alice sends state \( S_1 \), Bob’s detector \( \Pi_1 \) will not click but either \( \Pi_2 \) or \( \Pi_3 \) clicks with equal probability. We can write down the POVM in terms of \( a \)- and \( b \)-states. It may be useful to know that

\[
S_1 + S_2 + S_3 = \frac{1}{4} (1 - \tilde{\sigma}^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(2)} - \tilde{\sigma}^{(2)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(3)} - \tilde{\sigma}^{(3)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(1)}) = \frac{3}{2} 1, \tag{5.8}
\]

where we used the addition rule for spins

\[
\tilde{\sigma}^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(2)} - \tilde{\sigma}^{(2)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(3)} - \tilde{\sigma}^{(3)} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^{(1)} = -3. \quad (j = 1/2) \tag{5.9}
\]

A systematic way to find the POVM in terms of \( S_1, S_2, S_3 \) is to write

\[
\Pi_i = c_{i1} S_1 + c_{i2} S_2 + c_{i3} S_3, \quad i = 1, 2, 3 \tag{5.10}
\]
5.2. Eigenvalues of Arbitrary Linear Combinations of $S_1, S_2, \text{ and } S_3$

and use the conditions (5.8) to find the $c_{ik}$. The reader who wishes to do this calculation may find it helpful to know that

$$\text{tr}\{S_i S_j \} = \frac{3}{2} \delta_{ij} + \frac{1}{2} \quad i, j = 1, 2, 3. \quad (5.11)$$

In the end, we obtain

$$\Pi_1 = \frac{4}{9} (S_2 + S_3 - S_1/2), \quad (5.12)$$
$$\Pi_2 = \frac{4}{9} (S_3 + S_1 - S_2/2),$$
$$\Pi_3 = \frac{4}{9} (S_1 + S_2 - S_3/2).$$

5.2 Eigenvalues of Arbitrary Linear Combinations of $S_1, S_2, \text{ and } S_3$

Because of the particular significance of projectors to double trine states, we digress here to solve for the eigenvalues of an arbitrary linear combination of such operators. The states for the double trine $\{\ket{a_i}, \ket{b_i}\}$ belong to the $j = 1/2$ subspace, which is properly four-dimensional. This means that the numerical representation for the double trine states should, by right, also be four-dimensional. However, $\{\ket{a_i}, \ket{b_i}\}$ belong to orthogonal subspaces $m = 1/2$ and $m = -1/2$ within the $j = 1/2$ subspace, and they are independent trines in these smaller subspaces. Therefore, one can represent the double trines using identical 2-dimensional trines but residing in orthogonal subspaces. This simplifies our task here since it indicates that the $a$- and $b$-components can be treated independently. What happens is that the eigenvalues we get from a complete four-dimensional representation is the same as that of a 2-dimensional trine but is simply repeated.

Therefore, to simplify the eigenvalue calculation, we may consider just the set $\{\ket{a_i}\}$ of the double trine and choose this particularly convenient numerical representation for trines:

$$\ket{a_1} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \ket{a_2} = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ \sqrt{3} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \ket{a_3} = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ -\sqrt{3} \end{pmatrix},$$
and we wish to find the eigenvalues of

\[ S = c_1 S_1 + c_2 S_3 + c_3 S_3. \]

We can write down the trine projectors in the matrix representation

\[
S_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad S_2 = \frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -\sqrt{3} \\ -\sqrt{3} & 3 \end{pmatrix}, \quad S_3 = \frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \sqrt{3} \\ \sqrt{3} & 3 \end{pmatrix}
\]

From this we get

\[
S = \begin{pmatrix} c_1 + \frac{1}{4} (c_2 + c_3) & \frac{\sqrt{3}}{4} (c_3 - c_2) \\ \frac{\sqrt{3}}{4} (c_3 - c_2) & \frac{3}{4} (c_2 + c_3) \end{pmatrix}.
\]

Let us call the eigenvalues of \( S \) as \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_2 \). Using the trace and determinant of \( S \):

\[
tr\{S\} = \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 = c_1 + c_2 + c_3 \quad (5.13)
\]
\[
det(S) = \lambda_1 \lambda_2 = \frac{3}{4} (c_1 c_2 + c_2 c_3 + c_3 c_1). \quad (5.14)
\]

we get the expression for the eigenvalues to be

\[
\lambda_{1,2} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (c_1 + c_2 + c_3) \pm \sqrt{(c_1^2 + c_2^2 + c_3^2) - (c_1 c_2 + c_2 c_3 + c_3 c_1)} \right].
\]

Knowing the properties of \( S \) allows us to impose conditions on \( c_1, c_2, \) and \( c_3 \):

\[
\lambda_{1,2} > 0 \ \Rightarrow \ det(S) > 0 \ \Rightarrow \ c_1 c_2 + c_2 c_3 + c_3 c_1 > 0, \quad (5.15)
\]
\[
tr\{S\} > 0 \ \Rightarrow \ c_1 + c_2 + c_3 > 0. \quad (5.16)
\]

### 5.3 Cyclic Operator for Double Trine States

Observe that the underlying symmetry with trines allowed us to quickly work out expressions for various linear operators by a mere cyclic permutation of spins. This technique of cyclic exchange of spin positions corresponds exactly to a unitary transformation on our trine states that convert any given state into the next one in the set. The (unitary
5.4. An Effective Quantum Channel between Alice and Bob

An Hermitian cyclic swapping operator $G$ which performs this operation in general is

$$
G = \frac{1}{12} \left[ \left( 1 + \vec{\sigma}(1) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) \right) \left( 1 + \vec{\sigma}(2) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) \right) + \left( 1 + \vec{\sigma}(1) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(2) \right) \left( 1 + \vec{\sigma}(2) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) \right) \right]
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{4} \left[ 1 + \vec{\sigma}(1) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(2) + \vec{\sigma}(2) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) + \vec{\sigma}(3) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(1) + i(\vec{\sigma}(1) \times \vec{\sigma}(2)) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) \right].
$$

(5.17)

There are slightly different forms of $G$ that will do the job but the one presented above treats all spin-1/2 ingredients on the same footing. Expressing this operator in terms of the $a$- and $b$-states is probably more straightforward:

$$
G' = \frac{2}{3} \left[ |a_2\rangle\langle a_1| + |a_3\rangle\langle a_2| + |a_1\rangle\langle a_3| + (|b_2\rangle\langle b_1| + |b_3\rangle\langle b_2| + |b_1\rangle\langle b_3|) \right].
$$

However, converting this expression into one that involves only the Pauli operators results in an operator that looks very different from the earlier operator mentioned just above. The cyclic operator $G'$ actually looks like this

$$
G' = \frac{1}{4} \left[ 1 + i(\vec{\sigma}(1) \times \vec{\sigma}(2)) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) - \frac{1}{3}(\vec{\sigma}(1) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(2) + \vec{\sigma}(2) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(3) + \vec{\sigma}(3) \cdot \vec{\sigma}(1)) \right].
$$

The main difference between $G$ and $G'$ is that the former acts on both the $j = 3/2$ and $j = 1/2$ subspaces while the latter acts exclusively on the $j = 1/2$ double trine subspace.

5.4 An Effective Quantum Channel between Alice and Bob

In Chapter 4, we described the traditional cryptographic scheme using qubit trines, protocols where Alice sends qubits to Bob. Such an arrangement gives the appearance of an apparent asymmetry between Alice and Bob, when in all known cases, the final security analysis does not distinguish between Alice and Bob. That is, for any protocol, Eve has no clear advantage of eavesdropping on either the sender or the receiver because both of them have the same exact amount of information for producing the key.

To make the situation symmetric with respect to Alice and Bob, we replace the channel between Alice and Bob with a source that distributes entangled qubits to both
Alice and Bob. This is a rather standard technique in cryptographic security analysis, where the original scenario and the distributed setting can be shown to be mathematically equivalent. In fact, for the source that distributes the states, complete control is given to Eve in order to establish the error threshold where security can be guaranteed.

In this case, the distributed setup requires six qubits, where three qubits each are prepared and sent to Alice and Bob. However, we must ensure that we retain the properties of an ordinary trine-based scheme. Thus for example, if Alice measures the state $|a_1\rangle$ for her qubits, Bob should not get the same state at his side. In reality, there will always be unavoidable imperfections to such a quantum channel that may allow Bob to observe the same state, an effect we can treat as due to noise. By convention, we assume that errors observed by Alice and Bob result from Eve’s attempts to listen in on their communication and obtain the key. Thus, in the interest of full security, they have to treat noise as some information about the key leaking to Eve. In fact it is standard practice to permit Eve to do any sort of operation not explicitly prohibited by the laws of physics to accomplish her objective. We will worry later about the effects of noise, its discussion postponed to the next chapter. In the meantime, the next crucial step is to determine the set of all statistical operators that describes the six-qubit system emitted by the source consistent with the double trine scheme.

Before proceeding, we enumerate some important ingredients of the scheme which should prove useful later. Let’s define Alice and Bob’s POVM operators as (the indices are chosen to be in line with the subsection that immediately follows this)

\[
\begin{align*}
(Alice) \quad P_i & = \frac{2}{3} S_i = \frac{2}{3} (|a_i\rangle\langle a_i| + |b_i\rangle\langle b_i|) \quad & \text{for } i = 1, 2, 3 \\
(Bob) \quad P_j & = \frac{2}{3} S_j = \frac{2}{3} (|a_j\rangle\langle a_j| + |b_j\rangle\langle b_j|) \quad & \text{for } j = 4, 5, 6.
\end{align*}
\]

These two sets of POVM operators are in fact mathematically identical, but we distinguish Alice’s and Bob’s operators to emphasize the fact Alice and Bob do not have to share a reference frame. In general, the corresponding elements of the two POVMs will be related by a unitary transformation.
5.4.1 Pure $j=0$ Source State in the Noise-Free Channel

Our initial task is to find the pure $j = 0$ state for the quantum source.\footnote{Just as friendly reminder that $j = 0$ refers to total angular momentum of the spins.} To simplify matters, we tackle the noiseless case first. One approach to find this state is to exploit the following property of the source state: corresponding pairs of qubits for Alice and Bob (recall that each of them gets three qubits each) are never simultaneously in the singlet state. We know this to be true because of the way the double trine states are constructed: a singlet is attached to a noisy qubit (e.g., $|\text{singlet}\rangle|\text{noisy}\rangle$), where the position of the noisy qubit differentiates a particular trine state from the other two.

Let us label Alice’s qubits by $\{1, 2, 3\}$ and Bob’s qubits by $\{4, 5, 6\}$. If we apply the projectors for the singlet to corresponding qubits of Alice and Bob, the measurement outcome must be a null result. For example, if we take the operator that projects the qubits in $(1, 2)$ and $(4, 5)$ and apply it to the pure state, it should give us zero. If qubits $k$ and $l$ form a projector for the singlet, we call it $S(k, l)$. If the pure $j = 0$ source state is $|\Psi; j = 0\rangle$ the condition we impose is

$$S(k, l) \otimes S(k + 3, l + 3)|\Psi; j = 0\rangle = 0, \quad k, l = 1, 2, 3. \quad (5.19)$$

Let $T(i, j)$ denote the projector for the triplet sector involving qubits $i$ and $j$. The above condition implies that for each term in the pure $j = 0$ source state, a singlet state is combined with two pairs of qubits in the triplet sector. We can then write down the pure $j = 0$ state in the following form:

$$|\Psi; j = 0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{12}}(|S(1, 2)T(4, 5)T(3, 6)) + |S(2, 3)T(5, 6)T(1, 4)) + |S(3, 1)T(6, 4)T(2, 5)) + |T(1, 2)S(4, 5)T(3, 6)) + |T(2, 3)S(5, 6)T(1, 4)) + |T(3, 1)S(5, 6)T(2, 5)). \quad (5.20)$$

To elucidate how this state was constructed, take the first term, $|S(1, 2)T(4, 5)T(3, 6))$. Here, spins 1 and 2 are in a singlet state. For the remaining four spins, we wish the two qubit pairs to be matched in such a way that the total spin is zero. This can be done...
systematically by noting that a pair of qubits in a triplet state can have spin quantum numbers $m = 1, 0, -1$. For example, if we write down the state for qubits 3 to 6 as $|m_{45}, m_{36}\rangle$, since $m = 0$ for a spin singlet, this means we need $m_{45} + m_{36} = 0$ to get $j = 0$. In terms of the quantum numbers, we can find the desired source state using the lowering operator $J_-$:

$$J_- = J_-^{(k)} + J_-^{(l)},$$

$$J_- |m_k m_l\rangle = |(m_k - 1)m_l\rangle + |m_k(m_l - 1)\rangle.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.21)

Starting with the state $|m_{45} = 1, m_{36} = 1\rangle = |1, 1\rangle$, we apply the $J_-$ operator twice to get the desired $j = 0$ state for spins 3 to 6, $|(1, -1) + | -1, 1\rangle - 2|0, 0\rangle)/2$, paying close attention to the proper pairing of spins. This expression can be translated in terms of up and down spins by recalling that triplet spin pairs

$$|m = 1\rangle \equiv |\uparrow\uparrow\rangle,$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.22)

$$|m = -1\rangle \equiv |\downarrow\downarrow\rangle,$$  

$$|m = 0\rangle \equiv (|\uparrow\downarrow\rangle + |\downarrow\uparrow\rangle)/\sqrt{2}.$$  

The other terms in the source state can be found by considering all other possible positions for the pair of spins in a singlet state. Writing out the source state explicitly using up and down spins:

$$|\Psi; j = 0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{12}} [(|\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle) + (|\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle) + (|\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle) + (|\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle) + (|\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle) + (|\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle - |\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle) + (|\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle - |\downarrow\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\rangle) + (|\uparrow\downarrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle - |\downarrow\uparrow\uparrow\downarrow\downarrow\rangle)].$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.23)

5.4.2 A general pure state for the noise-free source

Although we already know what specific source state that Alice and Bob can use for implementing the protocol, it is not sufficient if we want to check general security properties of the double trine scheme. Unconditional security requires us to investigate the
most general form of the source that is compatible with the scheme, since we are allowing
Eve to have full control of the device that distributes the qubits to Alice and Bob.

For simplicity, we continue looking for a pure state but this time we drop the con-
dition for the total spin. Although it is highly likely that the most general source state
will be a mixed state, we restrict ourselves to pure states on the pragmatic assumption
that Eve gains no clear advantage in utilizing a mixture for the source. (Recall that
a mixed state is associated with a quantum system that can be found in one of many
states in an ensemble; hence, it is somewhat more difficult to distinguish states in a
mixed state than in pure one.)

To find this state, we have seen that it is advantageous to define some new states:
\[
|u_1\rangle = |↑↓↓\rangle, \quad |u_2\rangle = |↓↑↓\rangle, \quad |u_3\rangle = |↓↓↑\rangle,
\]
\[
|d_1\rangle = |↓↑↑\rangle, \quad |d_3\rangle = |↑↓↑\rangle, \quad |d_3\rangle = |↑↑↓\rangle,
\]
(Eq. 5.24)
The definition is quite straightforward: \(u\) refers to spin-up while \(d\) refers to spin-down
and the index refers to the position of the spin in the trio which differs from the other
two. This leads to the \(a\)- and \(b\)-states being denoted by
\[
|a_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|d_3\rangle - |d_2\rangle), \quad |a_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|d_1\rangle - |d_3\rangle), \quad |a_3\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|d_2\rangle - |d_1\rangle), \quad (5.25)
\]
\[
|b_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|u_3\rangle - |u_2\rangle), \quad |b_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|u_1\rangle - |u_3\rangle), \quad |b_3\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|u_2\rangle - |u_1\rangle).
\]

In constructing the general pure state \(|\Psi_{\text{gen}}\rangle\), we first construct the \(j = 1/2\) states
for Alice and Bob and then impose the probability conditions of the scheme (for the
noiseless channel):
\[
\text{prob}(i, j) = \text{tr}\{P_i Q_j |\Psi_{\text{gen}}\rangle\langle\Psi_{\text{gen}}|\} = \frac{1}{6} (1 - \delta_{ij}) \quad \text{for } i, j = 1, 2, 3.
\]
The construction of the \(j = 1/2\) double trine states is greatly facilitated by looking
closely at this pair of states:

\[ |d_2⟩ + |d_3⟩ + |d_1⟩ \sqrt{3} \quad (j = 3/2, m = 1/2), \tag{5.26} \]
\[ |u_2⟩ + |u_3⟩ + |u_1⟩ \sqrt{3} \quad (j = 3/2, m = -1/2). \]

These two vectors reside in a subspace orthogonal to the double trine subspace so what we want are kets orthogonal to this pair.\(^2\) For \( j = 1/2, m = 1/2 \), we can have

\[ |⇑_1⟩ = \frac{|d_2⟩ + |d_3⟩q + |d_1⟩q^2}{\sqrt{3}}, \tag{5.27} \]
\[ |⇑_2⟩ = \frac{|d_2⟩ + |d_3⟩q^2 + |d_1⟩q}{\sqrt{3}}, \]

while for \( j = 1/2, m = -1/2 \), we can have

\[ |⇓_1⟩ = \frac{|u_2⟩ + |u_3⟩q + |u_1⟩q^2}{\sqrt{3}}, \tag{5.28} \]
\[ |⇓_2⟩ = \frac{|u_2⟩ + |u_3⟩q^2 + |u_1⟩q}{\sqrt{3}}. \]

The quantity \( q \) that appears in the states above is the complex phase \( q = \exp(i2\pi/3) \).

One may also keep to real coefficients, where using the following states is equally good:

\[ |⇑_1⟩ = \frac{|d_2⟩ - |d_1⟩}{\sqrt{3}}, \tag{5.29} \]
\[ |⇑_2⟩ = \frac{|d_2⟩ - 2|d_3⟩ + |d_1⟩}{\sqrt{3}}, \]
\[ |⇓_1⟩ = \frac{|u_2⟩ - |u_1⟩}{\sqrt{3}}, \]
\[ |⇓_2⟩ = \frac{|u_2⟩ - 2|u_3⟩ + |u_1⟩}{\sqrt{3}}. \]

\(^2\)It might be worth noting that the states of (5.27)-(5.28) are related to the \( |u_i⟩ \) and \( |d_j⟩ \) by a discrete Fourier transform, also known as the quantum Fourier transform in some contexts.
To make the notation simpler we make the following definitions:

\[
X = \begin{pmatrix}
    x_{11} & x_{12} \\
    x_{21} & x_{22}
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(5.30)

\[
[\uparrow\downarrow] = \begin{pmatrix}
    |\uparrow_1\downarrow_1\rangle & |\uparrow_1\downarrow_2\rangle \\
    |\uparrow_2\downarrow_1\rangle & |\uparrow_2\downarrow_2\rangle
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
X \oplus [\uparrow\downarrow] = |\uparrow_1\downarrow_1\rangle x_{11} + |\uparrow_1\downarrow_2\rangle x_{12} + |\uparrow_2\downarrow_1\rangle x_{21} + |\uparrow_2\downarrow_2\rangle x_{22}.
\]

The above definitions allow us to write the general pure state\(^3\) as

\[
|\Psi_{\text{gen}}\rangle = W \oplus [\uparrow\downarrow] + X \oplus [\downarrow\uparrow] + Y \oplus [\uparrow\uparrow] + Z \oplus [\downarrow\downarrow].
\]

All that remains is to find the coefficients written as elements of the matrices \(W, X, Y,\) and \(Z.\)

The reader may find it useful to know the following inner products:

\[
\langle a_1 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_1 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{(q - 1)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

(5.31)

\[
\langle a_2 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_2 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{(q^2 - q)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_3 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_3 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{(1 - q^2)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_1 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_1 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = \frac{(q^2 - 1)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_2 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_2 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = \frac{(q - q^2)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_3 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_3 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = \frac{(1 - q)}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_i | \downarrow_j \rangle = \langle b_i | \uparrow_j \rangle = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2; \ j = 1, 2, 3.
\]

Those who prefer to utilize the \([\uparrow, \downarrow]-\)states with real coefficients will get the following

\(^3\)Note that this is restricted to the \(j = 1/2\) sector for both Alice and Bob
inner products for the particular choice in Eq. (5.29):

\[
\langle a_1 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_1 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{-1}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_2 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_2 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{-3}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_3 | \uparrow_1 \rangle = \langle b_3 | \downarrow_1 \rangle = \frac{-1}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_1 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_1 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = \frac{2}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_2 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_2 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = \frac{2}{\sqrt{6}},
\]

\[
\langle a_3 | \uparrow_2 \rangle = \langle b_3 | \downarrow_2 \rangle = 0,
\]

\[
\langle a_i | \downarrow_j \rangle = \langle b_i | \uparrow_j \rangle = 0, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2; \ j = 1, 2, 3
\]

What we obtain after imposing the probabilities is

\[
|\Psi_{gen}\rangle = (| \uparrow_2 \downarrow_1 \rangle - | \uparrow_1 \downarrow_2 \rangle) C_1 + (| \downarrow_2 \uparrow_1 \rangle - | \downarrow_1 \uparrow_2 \rangle) C_2
\]

\[+ (| \uparrow_2 \uparrow_1 \rangle - | \uparrow_1 \uparrow_2 \rangle) C_3 + (| \downarrow_2 \downarrow_1 \rangle - | \downarrow_1 \downarrow_2 \rangle) C_4
\]

where

\[
|C_1|^2 + |C_2|^2 + |C_3|^2 + |C_4|^2 = \frac{1}{2}.
\]

for a properly normalized state.

To make more explicit the number of arbitrary real parameters we can use the following parametrization:

\[
C_1 = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \cos \alpha
\]

\[
C_2 = e^{i\phi} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \sin \alpha \cos \beta
\]

\[
C_3 = e^{i\theta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \sin \alpha \sin \beta \cos \gamma
\]

\[
C_4 = e^{i\delta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \sin \alpha \sin \beta \sin \gamma
\]

where it is clear that the arbitrary parameters are the angles \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \theta, \phi\}. 
Bibliography


Chapter 6

General Security Analysis

The simplest description of a cryptographic scheme, whether classical or quantum, involves an ideal situation of perfect transmission between the communicating parties. In the real world, noise is always present, and therefore, a protocol can only claim to be secure if it can be implemented even when errors are inevitable. Techniques for coding information are used to construct particular assemblies of information that correct for errors automatically—these are called error correcting codes.

Unconditional security is established when, up to a certain level of noise in the channel, the scheme can still be used to privately transmit some finite amount of information. In an information-theoretic setting, this involves a broadcast channel with two receivers where one party is meant to receive confidential messages. A theorem by Csiszár and Körner tells us the conditions for distilling a secure key when a classical channel is used. For a scheme involving a quantum channel with one-way public communications, we evaluate the C-K yield by invoking an additional theorem on the accessible information in a quantum channel, involving a quantity called the Holevo bound. Once the error threshold and its corresponding secure information rate are established, the remaining task is to find an error-correcting code for producing the key. Fortunately, a coding theorem for attaining the ultimate distillable key rate using quantum states was proven by Devetak and Winter [1]. In this chapter, we perform a general security analysis on the double trine scheme. The methodology here loosely follows the analysis for raw-data attacks in BB84 [2] and for the Singapore protocol [3].
6.1 Equivalent Formalism with Signal-Idler Qubits

In the previous chapter, we found a general expression for the pure state that can be used to distribute the qubits to Alice and Bob who communicate by using the double trine scheme. To establish unconditional security, we calculate the bound on the accessible information subject to the optimal measurement that Eve can perform on her ancillas in her quest to discriminate the double trine states—the HSW bound for the source characterized by $|\Psi_{\text{gen}}\rangle$ in Eq. (5.33).

Using the six-qubit source state above can make calculations rather tedious, especially when noise is introduced into the system. Fortunately, the properties of the above scheme can be equivalently described in a much simpler manner by an abstract four-qubit system, where two of the qubits are used in key generation while the other two carry no useful information and remain unused [4]. An alternative formalism is possible since we discover that there are in fact only four particular combinations of $j = 1/2$ states that are relevant in the scheme, which suggests that we only need four states in any suitable basis. To illustrate this, let us define

\begin{align*}
|\uparrow_1\rangle &= |+\rangle, \\
|\uparrow_2\rangle &= |-\rangle, \\
|\downarrow_1\rangle &= |-\rangle, \\
|\downarrow_2\rangle &= |+\rangle.
\end{align*}

One can think of $|+\rangle$ and $|-\rangle$ as states of any two-level system. The key to simplification lies in the assignment of qubits. If we arrange things so that the first and third positions are given to Alice and the 2nd and 4th positions are given to Bob, then we can rewrite the general pure source state (5.33) as the four-qubit state:

\begin{equation}
|\Psi_{\text{gen}}\rangle = \left(|++\rangle - |-+\rangle - |+-\rangle + |--\rangle\right)C_1 + \left(|++\rangle -|--\rangle - |+-\rangle + |--\rangle\right)C_2 \\
+ \left(|++\rangle -|--\rangle - |+-\rangle + |--\rangle\right)C_3 + \left(|++\rangle -|--\rangle - |+-\rangle + |--\rangle\right)C_4
\end{equation}

(6.2)
where $S_{12}$ refers to a singlet in the first two positions. In fact, we can rewrite the source as,

$$|\Psi_{gen}\rangle = |S_{12}\rangle |\phi_{34}\rangle,$$

(6.3)

where $|\phi_{34}\rangle$ can be any two-qubit state and is specified by a particular choice of the coefficients $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4$. In this form, it becomes readily apparent that any special properties of the scheme can only be embodied in the first two qubits since the qubits at positions 3 and 4 can be anything. This is reminiscent of experimentally realized qubits using photon polarizations, where there are the qubits that carry the useful information called signal qubits, and there are some extra qubits that play no significant role in practical implementations called idler qubits. This can be made more explicit if we observe the effect of the projectors for the $|a_i\rangle$ and $|b_i\rangle$ states. First, we define the projectors for the double trine:

$$S_1 = \frac{1}{4} \left(1 - \vec{\sigma}^{(2)} \cdot \vec{\sigma}^{(3)}\right) = (|a_1\rangle \langle a_1| + |b_1\rangle \langle b_1|),$$

$$S_2 = \frac{1}{4} \left(1 - \vec{\sigma}^{(3)} \cdot \vec{\sigma}^{(1)}\right) = (|a_2\rangle \langle a_2| + |b_2\rangle \langle b_2|),$$

$$S_3 = \frac{1}{4} \left(1 - \vec{\sigma}^{(1)} \cdot \vec{\sigma}^{(2)}\right) = (|a_3\rangle \langle a_3| + |b_3\rangle \langle b_3|).$$

Let us examine how these projectors affect the $|\uparrow\rangle$ and $|\downarrow\rangle$ states:

$$S_1 |\uparrow\rangle = \frac{2}{3} (|a_1\rangle \langle a_1| \uparrow_2 + |b_1\rangle \langle b_1| \uparrow_2)$$

$$= \frac{2}{3} \left(\frac{q^2 - 1}{\sqrt{6}} |\uparrow_1\rangle \langle q^2 - 1| \uparrow_2 + |\uparrow_2\rangle \langle q - 1| \uparrow_2\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{3} (|++\rangle - |-+\rangle q^2),$$

$$S_1 |+-\rangle = \frac{1}{3} (|+-\rangle - |--\rangle q^2),$$

$$S_1 |-\rangle = \frac{1}{3} (|--\rangle + |+-\rangle q + |-\rangle).$$

Notice how the second qubit is not affected by the $S_1$ projector. Hence, we may call this alternative formulation the **signal-idler formalism** for the double trine scheme.
To further simplify matters, we may drop any references to the second qubit and write:

\[ S_1|+\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (|+\rangle - |-\rangle q^2), \]
\[ S_1|-\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (-|+\rangle q + |-\rangle). \]  

We complete the list by including the result for the remaining projectors:

\[ S_2|+\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (|+\rangle - |-\rangle), \]
\[ S_2|-\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (-|+\rangle + |-\rangle), \]
\[ S_3|+\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (|+\rangle - |-\rangle q), \]
\[ S_3|-\rangle = \frac{1}{2} (-|+\rangle q^2 + |-\rangle). \]

Since two quantum states are defined up to an overall phase factor (of which \( q = \exp(i2\pi/3) \) is an example), we can rewrite the results above as \(^1\)

\[ S_j|j\rangle = |j\rangle, \quad j = 1, 2, 3, \]
\[ |j\rangle = |+\rangle q^{j+1} - |-\rangle q^{-j-1}, \]

where these newly defined \( j \)-states are, not surprisingly, vectors belonging to a trine. Accordingly, they possess the following properties:

\[ \sum_j |j\rangle = 0 \]  
\[ \langle j|k\rangle = 3\delta_{jk} - 1. \]

Expressing everything in terms of the \( j \)-states greatly simplify many of our subsequent calculations.

\(^1\)Since it is also completely arbitrary which is the first, second, or third state in a trine, we can simplify further by choosing the \( S_j \) projectors and the \( j \)-states such that

\[ |j\rangle = |+\rangle q^j - |-\rangle q^{-j}. \]

In any case, the properties that come after remain unaffected whichever definition is selected.
In this language, a general qubit state is expressed as

$$|Q\rangle = \sum_j |j\rangle \psi_j$$

(6.11)

where we can choose

$$\sum_j \psi_j = 0$$

so that

$$S_j |Q\rangle = |j\rangle \psi_j.$$  

(6.12)

We can write down states for qubit pairs as well, so a two-qubit state appears as

$$|Q_1 Q_2\rangle = \sum_{j,k} |jk\rangle \psi_{jk},$$

(6.13)

where this time we impose the conditions

$$\sum_j \psi_{jk} = \sum_k \psi_{jk} = 0.$$

In order to distinguish between the double trine projectors acting on the first and second qubit, we label them as $A_i$ and $B_i$, respectively.\(^2\) We can then write down the relation

$$A_j B_k |Q_1 Q_2\rangle = |jk\rangle \psi_{jk}.$$  

As a final remark to this section, it is worth mentioning that the general qubit state given here corresponds exactly to an RFF-qubit for the double trine scheme. To see the connection, we list down the Pauli vectors associated with the signal-idler qubits:

\[
\sigma_X^{(SIQ)} = \frac{2}{3} \left[ \frac{1}{4} \sigma^{(3)} \cdot \sigma^{(1)} - \frac{1}{8} (\sigma^{(2)} \cdot \sigma^{(3)} + \sigma^{(1)} \cdot \sigma^{(2)}) \right],
\]

(6.14)

\[
\sigma_Y^{(SIQ)} = \frac{1}{4 \sqrt{3}} \left( \sigma^{(1)} \cdot \sigma^{(2)} - \sigma^{(2)} \cdot \sigma^{(3)} \right),
\]

\[
\sigma_Z^{(SIQ)} = \frac{1}{6 \sqrt{3}} \left[ (\sigma^{(2)} \times \sigma^{(1)}) \cdot \sigma^{(3)} + (\sigma^{(1)} \times \sigma^{(3)}) \cdot \sigma^{(2)} + (\sigma^{(3)} \times \sigma^{(2)}) \cdot \sigma^{(1)} \right].
\]

\(^2\)This means that $S_i = A_i = B_i$. Here the labels are conveniently chosen so that one can easily associate the double trine operators to Alice and Bob.
We can check that these components of $\vec{\sigma}^{(SIQ)}$ are rotationally invariant and that they obey the usual properties for Pauli operators:

$$\text{tr}\{\sigma_k^{(SIQ)}\} = 0,$$

$$\sigma_i^{(SIQ)} \sigma_j^{(SIQ)} = \delta_{ij} + i\epsilon_{ijk} \sigma_k^{(SIQ)}, \text{ for } i, j, k = X, Y, Z.$$

### 6.2 Source with Eve’s Ancilla States

Having established a simplifying formalism, we apply this to the security analysis of the double trine scheme by letting Eve entangle her ancilla states with the two-qubit state that Alice and Bob receive. In this situation the source state is given by

$$|S\rangle = \sum_{j,k} |jkE_{jk}\rangle,$$

(6.16)

where $|j\rangle$ is received by Alice, $|k\rangle$ is received by Bob, and $|E_{jk}\rangle$ refer to Eve’s ancilla.

Eve’s task remains the same as in any protocol: to maximize her mutual information with Alice (or Bob, depending on whom she eavesdrops). For every such state that Eve sends, there is a corresponding optimal POVM that will maximize her information. The actual appearance of the POVM elements depend on several adjustable parameters determined by observing that insisting on a source state with the structure given above is equivalent to constraints imposed by expected probabilities of measurement outcomes by Alice and Bob. To measure the state of the qubits, Alice and Bob use suitable POVMs composed of the $A_j$ projectors we described in a previous section. Note that

$$\sum_j A_j = 1,$$

(6.17)

which are exactly the properties we need for elements of a POVM. When Alice and Bob apply their POVM operators, the result is

$$A_j B_k |S\rangle = |jkE_{jk}\rangle.$$
6.2. Source with Eve’s Ancilla States

Naturally we have the probability conditions:

\[ p_{jk} = \langle S|A_j B_k|S \rangle = 4\langle E_{jk}|E_{jk} \rangle = (1 - \varepsilon)\frac{1}{6}(1 - \delta_{jk}) + \frac{\varepsilon}{9}. \]  (6.18)

To choose the parameters for Eve’s ancillas, we can express \(|E_{jk}\rangle\) in a relatively symmetric fashion with

\[ |E_{jk}\rangle = \frac{1}{9} \left[ |E_1\rangle q^{-j-k} + |E_2\rangle q^{-j+k} + |E_3\rangle q^{j-k} + |E_4\rangle q^{j+k} \right]. \]

Obtaining a set of ancillas that provide Eve the most knowledge about Alice and Bob’s qubits requires finding the \(|E_i\rangle\) states which satisfy

\[ V = \begin{pmatrix} |E_1\rangle & |E_2\rangle & |E_3\rangle & |E_4\rangle \end{pmatrix}, \]  (6.19)

\[ V^\dagger V = \frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix} 1 + a + b + c & u & v & 0 \\ u^* & 1 + a - b - c & -2(1 - \varepsilon) & -v \\ v^* & -2(1 - \varepsilon) & 1 - a + b - c & -u \\ 0 & -v^* & -u^* & 1 - a - b + c \end{pmatrix} \]

for \(a, b, c \in \mathbb{R}\) and \(u, v \in \mathbb{C}\). The matrix \(V^\dagger V\) is nothing more than constraints imposed by the probabilities \(p_{jk}\) on the inner products between the \(|E_i\rangle\) states.

Taking the simplest case of \(u = v = 0\), positivity of the above matrix requires \(a = b = 0\). Thus the resulting matrix is

\[ M = \frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix} 1 + c & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 - c & -2(1 - \varepsilon) & 0 \\ 0 & -2(1 - \varepsilon) & 1 - c & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 + c \end{pmatrix}. \]

If we factorize this matrix \(M\) as \(V^T V\) so it automatically fulfills the positivity condition,
we obtain
\[ V = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{1+c} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x & y & 0 \\ 0 & y & x & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \sqrt{1+c} \end{pmatrix} \hat{=} \left( |E_1\rangle \ |E_2\rangle \ |E_3\rangle \ |E_4\rangle \right), \tag{6.20} \]
where
\[ x^2 + y^2 = 1 - c, \quad -1 \leq c \leq 2\varepsilon - 1 \tag{6.21} \]
\[ 2xy = -2(1 - \varepsilon). \]
Thus, Eve’s ancilla states are composed of the kets
\[ |E_{jk}\rangle \hat{=} \frac{1}{18} \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{1+cq^{-j-k}} \\ xq^{-j+k} + yq^{j-k} \\ xq^{j-k} + yq^{-j+k} \\ \sqrt{1+cq^{j+k}} \end{pmatrix}. \tag{6.22} \]
We can now calculate brackets of these \(|E_{jk}\rangle\) states. All relevant brackets can be obtained from the following set, noting that \((j, k, l)\) can be any permutation of \((1, 2, 3)\).
\[
\begin{align*}
\langle E_{kj}|E_{kj}\rangle &= \frac{3 - \varepsilon}{162}, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{kk}\rangle &= \frac{-\varepsilon}{162}, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{kl}\rangle &= \frac{-3 + 2\varepsilon}{162}, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{jl}\rangle &= \frac{-3 + 3c + 4\varepsilon}{324}, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{jj}\rangle &= \frac{3 - 3c - 2\varepsilon}{324}, \\
\langle E_{kk}|E_{kk}\rangle &= \frac{\varepsilon}{81}.
\end{align*}
\]
Eve can choose whether she wants to eavesdrop on Alice or Bob. Because of the asymmetric nature of the scheme, the resulting conditioned ancilla states will be different. We also consider the bit case and trit case independently since these are mutually
exclusive events. If Eve eavesdrops on Alice, the unnormalized conditioned ancillas for the bit case are

\[ \rho^{(A)}_{jk} = |E_{kj}E_{lk}\rangle\langle E_{kj}E_{lk}| + |E_{lj}E_{jk}\rangle\langle E_{lj}E_{jk}| + |E_{kj}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{kj}E_{lj}| + |E_{kk}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{kk}E_{lj}|, \]

\[ \rho^{(A)}_{kj} = |E_{jk}E_{kj}\rangle\langle E_{jk}E_{kj}| + |E_{ik}E_{jk}\rangle\langle E_{ik}E_{jk}| + |E_{jk}E_{ik}\rangle\langle E_{jk}E_{ik}| + |E_{kk}E_{ik}\rangle\langle E_{kk}E_{ik}|, \]

\[ \rho^{(A)}_l = |E_{jl}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{jl}E_{lj}| + |E_{kl}E_{jl}\rangle\langle E_{kl}E_{jl}| + |E_{lj}E_{kl}\rangle\langle E_{lj}E_{kl}| + |E_{ll}E_{kl}\rangle\langle E_{ll}E_{kl}|, \]

where \(j\) and \(k\) refer to any 2 distinct elements taken from the set of outcomes \(\{A, B, C\}\), the subscripts \(jk\) and \(kj\) referring to the possible bit results, and the superscript \(A\) telling us the density operators are conditioned on Alice.

To get an idea how these states were obtained, let us look at the first term of \(\rho^{(A)}_{jk}\): each \(|E_{jk}\rangle\) refers to a pair of measurement outcomes, the first index belonging to Alice and the second one to Bob. So Alice’s pair is \((k, l)\) while Bob’s is \((j, k)\). Bob has different states so this is a bit case and they will agree on \((j, k)\). For the trit case, we have

\[ \rho^{(A)}_j = |E_{kj}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{kj}E_{lj}| + |E_{lj}E_{kj}\rangle\langle E_{lj}E_{kj}| + |E_{kk}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{kk}E_{lj}| + |E_{lk}E_{lj}\rangle\langle E_{lk}E_{lj}|, \]

\[ \rho^{(A)}_k = |E_{jk}E_{ik}\rangle\langle E_{jk}E_{ik}| + |E_{ik}E_{jk}\rangle\langle E_{ik}E_{jk}| + |E_{jj}E_{ik}\rangle\langle E_{jj}E_{ik}| + |E_{lj}E_{ik}\rangle\langle E_{lj}E_{ik}|, \]

\[ \rho^{(A)}_l = |E_{jl}E_{il}\rangle\langle E_{jl}E_{il}| + |E_{il}E_{jl}\rangle\langle E_{il}E_{jl}| + |E_{jj}E_{il}\rangle\langle E_{jj}E_{il}| + |E_{jl}E_{il}\rangle\langle E_{jl}E_{il}|, \]

On the other hand, if Eve eavesdrop on Bob, she gets the following ancilla states for the
One may notice that the conditioned ancilla states for Alice and Bob differ only on the terms that contribute errors to the key generation process. Thus, we explore both sets of ancillas, to see whether Eve gains any advantage by eavesdropping on either Alice or Bob, or if it does not make any difference to the optimal amount of information she can obtain. By construction $\sum_{j,k} |E_{jk} | = 0.$ (This is also a consequence of the fact that we define our states using a linearly dependent set). This gives us the following useful relations:

\[
\begin{align*}
|E_{kj}E_{lk}| + |E_{jl}E_{ik}| - |E_{lj}E_{ik}| - |E_{lj}E_{jk}| &= 0, \quad (6.27) \\
|E_{kj}E_{lk}| + |E_{kj}E_{jk}| - |E_{lj}E_{ik}| - |E_{lj}E_{ik}| &= 0, \\
|E_{lk}E_{kj}| + |E_{lk}E_{ij}| - |E_{kj}E_{lj}| - |E_{kj}E_{lj}| &= 0, \\
|E_{kk}E_{jj}| + |E_{kk}E_{lj}| - |E_{lj}E_{kj}| - |E_{lj}E_{kj}| &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

as well as for the trit case

\[\rho_j^{(B)} = |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}| + |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}| + |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}| + |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}| + |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}| + |E_{ij}E_{ij}|(E_{ij}E_{ij}|,
\]

\[\rho_k^{(B)} = |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}| + |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}| + |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}| + |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}| + |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}| + |E_{ki}E_{ki}|(E_{ki}E_{ki}|,
\]

\[\rho_t^{(B)} = |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}| + |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}| + |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}| + |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}| + |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}| + |E_{it}E_{it}|(E_{it}E_{it}|.
\]
6.3 Finding the Optimum Information Bound on Eve’s Ancillas

Ultimately, we are interested in finding the maximum amount of information that Eve can obtain by eavesdropping on Alice or Bob. From the previous section we recall that Eve’s states $|E_i\rangle$ in general depend on seven real parameters. We wish to find the values of these parameters such that Eve gets as much information about the measurement outcomes as possible. First, we treat the optimization problem with a single free parameter. The ancilla states for Eve are given by Eq. (6.22).

In this section, it will be convenient to define the following constants:

$$
a = \frac{3 - \epsilon}{162}, \quad b = \frac{-\epsilon}{162},
\quad c = \frac{-3 + 2\epsilon}{162}, \quad d = \frac{3 - 3\alpha - 2\epsilon}{324},
\quad e = \frac{3 + 3\alpha - 2\epsilon}{324}, \quad f = \frac{-3 + 3\alpha + 4\epsilon}{324},
\quad g = \frac{-3 - 3\alpha + 4\epsilon}{324}, \quad h = \frac{\epsilon}{81}.
$$

These numbers comprise the set of all possible values for the inner products among the $|E_{jk}\rangle$ in the one-parameter case, where $\alpha$ is the floating parameter. You can check this by solving the 81 relevant inner products using Eq. (6.22). We can then form the matrix of brackets from which we deduce a suitable representation of Eve’s ancilla states. Firstly, we obtain the following set of submatrices $B_i$ (the label refers to the bit case):

$$
B_1 = \begin{pmatrix}
a^2 & c^2 & ac \\
c^2 & a^2 & ca \\
ac & ca & a^2
\end{pmatrix},
B_2 = \begin{pmatrix}
ha & b^2 & hb \\
b^2 & ah & bh \\
ha & bh & h^2
\end{pmatrix},
B_3 = \begin{pmatrix}
bc & de & be \\
ed & cb & eb \\
bc & cb & b^2
\end{pmatrix},
B_4 = \begin{pmatrix}
f & c & d^2 & fd \\
d^2 & cf & df \\
fd & df & f^2
\end{pmatrix},
B_5 = \begin{pmatrix}
ha & b^2 & hb \\
ba & cb & b^2 \\
bc & cb & b^2
\end{pmatrix},
B_6 = \begin{pmatrix}
bc & de & be \\
eg & cg & eg \\
eg & cg & eg
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

(6.28)
which forms the larger matrix of brackets when arranged as

\[
B = \begin{pmatrix}
B_1 B_3 B_4 B_5^T \\
B_3^T B_2 B_5 B_6 \\
B_4 B_5^T B_1 B_3 \\
B_5 B_6 B_3^T B_2 
\end{pmatrix}.
\] (6.29)

The same thing should be done for the trit case:

\[
T = \begin{pmatrix}
T_{11} T_{22}^T T_{31}^T T_{41}^T T_{51}^T T_{61}^T \\
T_{22} T_{32} T_{42}^T T_{52}^T T_{62}^T \\
T_{31} T_{33} T_{43}^T T_{53}^T T_{63}^T \\
T_{41} T_{42} T_{43} T_{54}^T T_{64}^T \\
T_{51} T_{52} T_{53} T_{54} T_{65}^T T_{65}^T \\
T_{61} T_{62} T_{63} T_{64} T_{65} T_{66}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

where the elements of \( T \) are giving in Eq. (6.30) at the end of this section. Recall that our objective here is to factorize this matrix of brackets in order to get a matrix of ancilla states, which we will need to compute the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland (HSW) bound on the accessible information.

There are a few other things we can consider to help simplify our work. First, let’s look at certain relations among the various parameters characterizing the elements of \( B \). Using the constants given above, the following equations should be easy to verify:

\[
a + b + c = 0, \quad c + d + e = 0, \\
2b + h = 0, \quad b + d + f = 0, \\
b + g + e = 0.
\]

As a consequence, these equations allow us to determine eigencolumns with eigenvalue zero for \( B \) (and hence, deduce the number of dimensions in which the ancilla states reside). With the help of \( \sum_{j,k} |E_{jk}⟩ = 0 \) and its accompanying relations (6.28), we find
the following eigencolumns of eigenvalue zero:

\[(1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1, 0)^T, (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1)^T,\]

\[(0, 0, 0, -1, 1, 0, -1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)^T, (1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1, 0)^T.\]

This implies that the subspace for \(\{|E_{jk}\}\) must be at most eight-dimensional.\(^3\)

As promised earlier, we end the section by listing the elements of \(T\):

\[T_{11} = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 & bc & bc \\ bc & ah & b^2 \\ bc & b^2 & ah \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{21} = \begin{pmatrix} fc & ba & db \\ ba & gc & eb \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{22} = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 & bc & cb \\ bc & ah & b^2 \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{31} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & gd & e^2 \\ fe & b^2 & dg \\ c^2 & ed & de \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{32} = \begin{pmatrix} bd & hc & bc \\ ab & be & cg \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{33} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & ha & b^2 \\ cc & b^2 & ah \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{41} = \begin{pmatrix} de & b^2 & fg \\ ed & gf & b^2 \\ a^2 & bc & bc \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{42} = \begin{pmatrix} cb & e^2 & dg \\ ef & gd & b^2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{43} = \begin{pmatrix} f & ba & db \\ d^2 & bc & f e \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{44} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & ah & b^2 \\ bc & b^2 & ah \\ d^2 & ef & cb \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{51} = \begin{pmatrix} cb & e^2 & dg \\ ef & gd & b^2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{52} = \begin{pmatrix} de & b^2 & fg \\ db & eb & ch \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{53} = \begin{pmatrix} fb & b^2 & dg \\ bc & gd & e^2 \\ cf & bd & ab \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{54} = \begin{pmatrix} ba & gc & eb \\ db & eb & ch \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{55} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & ha & b^2 \\ c^2 & ed & de \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{61} = \begin{pmatrix} ab & bc & cg \\ bd & hc & bc \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{62} = \begin{pmatrix} fe & b^2 & dg \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{63} = \begin{pmatrix} de & b^2 & fg \\ ed & gf & b^2 \end{pmatrix},\]

\[T_{64} = \begin{pmatrix} fe & b^2 & dg \\ bc & gd & e^2 \\ d^2 & ef & cb \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{65} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & hc & bc \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_{66} = \begin{pmatrix} bc & ha & b^2 \\ ab & bc & cg \end{pmatrix}.\]

\(^3\)This can be used as a check on the numerical results we obtain later.
6.4 Numerical Results for the One-Parameter Optimization

We have opted to first try the special case of a single parameter since it is the simplest problem we can try to solve as well as it may be amenable to a full analytical solution. Unfortunately, the purely analytical result for finding the optimal parameter values remains elusive despite many efforts in simplification. Nonetheless, all our previous results can still be used to verify the numerical solutions we have obtained.

The numerical optimization was performed using a simple MATLAB code.\(^4\) (Some of the results have been double-checked using the SOMIM program [5], which uses a more efficient algorithm than the direct optimization method done here.) After the optimum is found, we can plot the accessible information and find the C-K yield for the double trine scheme. The relevant plots for ancillas conditioned on Alice and Bob are presented in Fig.(6.1) for the bit case and Fig.(6.2) for the trit case.

At first glance, the results reveal one rather troubling aspect: the amount of information that Eve gets if she eavesdrop on Alice is different from what she gets if she eavesdrops on Bob. This is a curious finding: intuitively, you would expect that Eve gets precisely the same amount of information from either because Alice and Bob’s qubits should carry the same information if they are to agree on a key. This is indeed the case if the channel were perfect but it is false when noise is present. The discrepancy originates from the error terms in the conditioned states, and in some sense you could say that Alice’s states are less informative to Eve when it comes to figuring out the key. What the results reflect is a genuine asymmetry in the key generation process between Alice and Bob. Although Alice and Bob have the same information for producing the key, the information available to Eve for a particular choice of \(\{|E_i\}\) is vastly different. In the single parameter case, we see that Eve would choose to eavesdrop on Bob since she gets more information for the same level of noise.

\(^4\)The MATLAB codes are available in the Appendix of this thesis.
Figure 6.1: One-parameter case: Wiretapper bound for Eve during a bit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.196$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.561$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.170, I_{C-K} = 0.604$.

Figure 6.2: One-parameter case: Wiretapper bound for Eve during a trit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.193$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.619$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.150, I_{C-K} = 0.744$.
6.5 Asymmetry between Alice’s and Bob’s Conditioned Ancillas

The numerical results for the computation of the Holevo bound indicate a glaring asymmetry between Alice and Bob. In both bit and trit cases, the numbers indicate a higher error threshold for Alice, meaning that it is more advantageous for Eve to eavesdrop on Alice at all times. This situation is quite perplexing because after the key is generated, we expect both versions of the key to contain exactly the same information. But it could be that this is not a real asymmetry. We note that the numerical computation uses a particular input ancilla state for Alice and Bob. It is still possible that given a different ancilla state, it would be more useful for Eve to look at Bob’s data. Furthermore, what would be interesting to show is that there is another set of Eve’s states that simply reverses the roles of Alice and Eve in the numerical analysis. To address all this issues, we have to optimize for all free parameters.

We recall that one symmetric parametrization of Eve’s ancillas is given by

$$|E_{jk}\rangle = \frac{1}{9} \left[ |E_1\rangle q^{-j-k} + |E_2\rangle q^{-j+k} + |E_3\rangle q^{j-k} + |E_4\rangle q^{j+k} \right],$$

where we can obtain the appropriate $|E_i\rangle$ states from the condition

$$M = V^T V = \begin{pmatrix} \langle E_1 \rangle \\ \langle E_2 \rangle \\ \langle E_3 \rangle \\ \langle E_4 \rangle \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} |E_1\rangle \ |E_2\rangle \ |E_3\rangle \ |E_4\rangle \end{pmatrix},$$

where $V$ and $|E_i\rangle$ are defined in Eq. (6.20). In this language, a different set of $|E_i\rangle$ corresponds to a different choice of the parameters $a, b, c, u$, and $v$.

In general, we observe that the analysis is greatly facilitated by choosing a suitable parameterization of $V$ that has a simple and manageable mathematical structure. It aids us a lot if we recall the following properties of the matrix $M$ and the vectors $|E_i\rangle$:
6.5. Asymmetry between Alice’s and Bob’s Conditioned Ancillas

- 1. It is positive, hermitian, and of unit trace.
- 2. \( \langle E_1 | E_4 \rangle = \langle E_4 | E_1 \rangle = 0 \).
- 3. \( \langle E_2 | E_3 \rangle = \langle E_3 | E_2 \rangle = -(1 - \epsilon)/2 \).
- 4. \( \langle E_1 | E_2 \rangle + \langle E_3 | E_4 \rangle = \langle E_2 | E_1 \rangle + \langle E_4 | E_3 \rangle = 0 \).
- 5. \( \langle E_1 | E_3 \rangle + \langle E_2 | E_4 \rangle \langle E_3 | E_1 \rangle + \langle E_4 | E_2 \rangle = 0 \).

One possible choice for the vectors \(| E_i \rangle\) is given by the columns of the following matrix:

\[
V = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix}
    a_1 & \lambda a_4 & -\mu a_4 & 0 \\
    0 & r_1 \cos(\theta) & -r_2 e^{i\phi} \sin(\theta) & 0 \\
    0 & r_2 e^{i\phi} \sin(\theta) & -r_2 \cos(\theta) & 0 \\
    0 & \mu^* a_1 & -\lambda^* a_1 & a_4
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

(6.32)

In this basis for Eve’s ancilla qubits, the matrix \( E \) appears as

\[
M = V^T V = \frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix}
    a_1^2 & \lambda a_1 a_4 & -\mu a_1 a_4 & 0 \\
    \lambda^* a_1 a_4 & P & R & \mu a_1 a_4 \\
    -\mu^* a_1 a_4 & R & Q & -\lambda a_1 a_4 \\
    0 & \mu^* a_1 a_4 & -\lambda^* a_1 a_4 & a_4^2
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

(6.33)

where

\[
P = r_1^2 + |\mu|^2 a_1^2 + |\lambda|^2 a_4^2,
\]

(6.34)

\[
Q = r_2^2 + |\mu|^2 a_2^2 + |\lambda|^2 a_1^2,
\]

\[
R = -2(1 - \epsilon).
\]

There are two more constraints on the set of parameters \( a_1, a_4, r_1, r_2, \lambda, \mu, \phi \), namely the condition for unit trace, and the condition relating the parameters to \( \epsilon \):

\[
4 = (1 + |\lambda|^2 + |\mu|^2)(a_1^2 + a_4^2) + r_1^2 + r_2^2,
\]

(6.35)

\[
2(1 - \epsilon) = \lambda^* \mu (a_1^2 + a_4^2) + r_1 r_2 e^{i\phi} \sin(2\theta).
\]
Note that in principle, how we decompose matrix $M$ is not important for obtaining the solution. However, we use the parameters above because it is more amenable to both analytical and numerical methods of optimization.

Before we optimize for the full set of parameters, we would also like to introduce another assumption about the ancilla states. Recall that to add a character to either the bit key or the trit key, Alice has to choose two positions on their measurement records. The sequence in which this positions is in fact not important: this is quite obvious in the trit case since the letter they will add to the key is the one not appearing on either position. For the bit case, this is less apparent but because the decision for assigning which order is ‘0’ and ‘1’ is random, then it should not depend on the order the positions are chosen. Note this condition of position order symmetry has not been shown to be a necessary one in general but is a definitely a reasonable symmetry property for the optimal solution. This leads to a set of constraints on the brackets of $|E_{jk}\rangle$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\langle E_{kj}|E_{kj}\rangle &= \langle E_{jk}|E_{jk}\rangle, & \langle E_{jj}|E_{jj}\rangle &= \langle E_{kk}|E_{kk}\rangle, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{kk}\rangle &= \langle E_{jk}|E_{jj}\rangle, & \langle E_{kk}|E_{lj}\rangle &= \langle E_{lj}|E_{lk}\rangle, \\
\langle E_{kj}|E_{lk}\rangle &= \langle E_{jk}|E_{lj}\rangle, & \langle E_{kk}|E_{lk}\rangle &= \langle E_{lj}|E_{lj}\rangle.
\end{align*}
$$

(6.36)

The two conditions on the first line are in fact automatically true. To satisfy the remaining constraints, we have to choose:

$$
\begin{align*}
a_1 &= a_4, & \mu &= \mu^*, \\
r_1 &= r_2, & \lambda &= -\lambda^*, \\
\phi &= 0.
\end{align*}
$$

By imposing these new conditions along with the previous ones, we effectively reduce the problem to two real parameters. The results of the C-K yield calculation appear in Figs. (6.3)-(6.4).

Within the numerical accuracy of the program, the results obtained here coincide
Figure 6.3: Optimizing with position order symmetry: Wiretapper bound for Eve eavesdropping during a bit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.197$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.560$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.170$, $I_{C-K} = 0.603$.

Figure 6.4: Optimizing with position order symmetry: Wiretapper bound for Eve eavesdropping during a trit case. For Alice, the error threshold is $\epsilon = 0.193$ corresponding to a C-K yield of $I_{C-K} = 0.618$. The corresponding numbers for Bob are $\epsilon = 0.150$, $I_{C-K} = 0.744$. 
precisely with the outcome of the one-parameter optimization. This is a rather aston-
ishing result. Remember that we ended up with a single parameter to optimize in the
earlier special case by simply setting some parameters to zero and imposing positivity.
Keeping all parameters free but then introducing a plausible symmetry into the $|E_{jk}\rangle$
states, the numerical result still did not change appreciably. We suspect that, in fact,
the optimal solution for the general case is identical to the solution of the one-parameter
case. We have not proven this to be definitely true but we have strong numerical evidence
pointing to this fact.
Bibliography


Chapter 7

Concluding Remarks

The main subject of this thesis is reference frame-free quantum key distribution using a double trine scheme. Due to the rotationally invariant construction of the quantum states used for distilling a secret key, the protocol is definitely basis-independent: Alice and Bob can choose their measurement coordinates independently without worrying about any decoherence due to mismatched bases. Of course, this provision works under the reasonable assumption that any environmental effects that may affect the qubits in transit affect all the qubits equally. It is not difficult to imagine that qubits traveling along the same medium (like photons propagating inside an optical fiber) will experience common external effects.

One curious characteristic of the key generation procedure used for the double trine scheme is its dual alphabet. Depending on how pairs of letters between Alice and Bob match, they may end up adding a symbol on the bit key or the trit key. Although it seems more complicated than the single-alphabet key distillation process for trines, which include inconclusive outcomes when Alice and Bob try to match letters, the two-alphabet key is actually more efficient, achieving an information rate of 98% of the channel capacity in the ideal scenario. In fact, the steps in the key distillation do not require specific properties of double trine states, which means that the dual-alphabet key generation can be utilized for any QKD protocol that uses trines.

Of course, the true value of a cryptographic protocol lies not only in the ease of implementation or the efficiency in generating a key. A cryptographic scheme is most
useful if it is unconditionally secure. The previous chapter dealt with analyzing the security of the double trine scheme using a convenient formalism with signal-idler logical qubits. As an important special case, we first considered a single parameter optimization problem where we set all except one of the adjustable parameters of our tomographically incomplete protocol to zero. The single parameter is reminiscent of the free parameter in the analysis of raw-data attacks for the BB84 scheme.

A remarkable result we obtain from the numerical calculations show that the single-parameter solution is already an optimal solution for the full optimization problem. To demonstrate this, we free up all the adjustable parameters but invoke an additional plausible symmetry assumption on the conditioned ancilla states. The symmetry has to do with the interchangeability of the order of the pairs of letters chosen by Alice. Each symbol in the key is generated from pairs of letters from the transmitted raw data. We observe that Alice has the freedom to choose which is the first letter of the pair and which one is the second; this is inconsequential in producing the key. By imposing this symmetry, we arrive at a two-parameter optimization problem, the solution reproduces that of the special case.

We found an absolute noise threshold of ε = 0.170 for the bit case and ε = 0.15 for the trit case, both of which are achieved by Eve only if she eavesdrops on Bob. Hence, we see one curious implication of this result: there is a way of choosing the states such that it is more advantageous to eavesdrop on one party. As far as we are aware of, this is not the case for any other protocols, at least for the more popular ones like BB84 and E91 and their variants, or for trine-based schemes like PBC00. We suspect, but have not shown rigorously, that the asymmetry is a direct consequence of the asymmetry in the key generation process itself: although Alice and Bob arrive at the same key in the ideal case, they do so through using entirely different symbols from the raw data. This creates a discrepancy in how Eve’s ancillas are conditioned: she acquires different amounts of information from Alice and Bob for any specific source state she uses. This further implies that the two roles in the key distillation are not completely interchangeable, in the sense that there is no other choice of the source such that the amount of information that Alice acquires from eavesdropping are simply reversed. Note however that once
Alice and Bob performs further classical post-processing tasks such as error correction and privacy amplification, they can use Bob’s set of letters for reference to make things more difficult for Eve.

A full optimization of the seven parameters without any other preconditions will resolve any remaining issues. However, the task remains difficult because of the relatively complicated dependence of the source state on the seven parameters. The primary impediment has been in handling some of the nonlinear constraints. Such a parameter space may still manageable using nonlinear numerical optimization techniques but it is virtually inaccessible to analytical methods without additional assumptions being imposed.

It will also be interesting to discuss the details of a practical implementation of the scheme. Producing entangled states has never been an easy task, with the difficulty increasing rapidly with size. A practical system with a common source for Alice and Bob requires six entangled qubits for each transmission. It makes more sense to use the variant were Alice prepares the states and sends them to Bob; this will require only three qubits and this would be much easier to produce. As with other QKD protocols, photon polarizations remain the most likely candidate for an actual working prototype for preparing double trine states. It is in fact quite easy to envision and implement the following situation: Alice prepares three-photon trine states by first producing two of the three photons in a polarization Bell-state. The remaining photon then carries a completely random polarization. Bob’s POVM would then tests if one of the three orthogonal Bell-states is present for every trio of photons Alice sends him.
Appendix

MATLAB codes for calculating Holevo bounds in the one-parameter and position-order symmetry cases

A. Main program for calculating the Holevo bound and the C-K yield

Given below is the MATLAB script file that generates the security analysis data. The example is the one for Eve eavesdropping on Alice in a bit case and thus uses \texttt{mutualInfoAEbit}. You can replace this function with \texttt{mutualInfoAEtrit}, \texttt{mutualInfoBEbit}, and \texttt{mutualInfoBEtrit} to compute the C-K yield for the Alice trit case, Bob bit case, and Bob trit case, respectively in the single-parameter optimization. For the full optimization with position order symmetry, we use the functions \texttt{searchMax} and \texttt{AliceBitMutualInfo}, \texttt{BobBitMutualInfo}, \texttt{AliceTritMutualInfo}, \texttt{BobTritMutualInfo} to calculate \texttt{optimum}.

\begin{verbatim}
% main script file for running code

clear all
n = 10000;

u(1) = 0; v(1) = 1; y(1) = -1; w = linspace(0,1,n+1);

for j = 1:n
    v(j+1) = mutualInfoABbit(j/n);
    optimum = grSearchMax('mutualInfoAEbit',j/n,[-1 (2*(j/n)-1)], 100);
    y(j+1) = optimum(1);
    u(j+1) = optimum(2);
end
\end{verbatim}
B. Cholesky decomposition of positive semi-definite matrices

MATLAB has an efficient built-in function for calculating the Cholesky decomposition of a positive definite matrix. However, it does not work for matrices with zero eigenvalues. Hence, the need for constructing a special code to handle our density operators. When you have a positive semi-definite matrix $M$, the choice for the upper triangular matrix $U$ such that $M = U^TU$ is not unique. However, for the purposes of calculating the Holevo bound, it is sufficient to choose any matrix $U$ that works.

```matlab
function U = CholeskyDecomposition(M, tol)
% This function yields the Cholesky or triangular decomposition of
% a positive semi-definite matrix M such that M = U'*U

[m,n] = size(M);
if m ~= n
    error('M must be a square matrix');
end
U = zeros(n); rankM = rank(M);

for i = 1:n
    for j = i:n
        if j == 1
            s = M(i,i);
        else
            s = M(i,j) - U(1:i-1,i)'*U(1:i-1,j);
        end
        if abs(s) < tol
            s = 0;
        end
        if j > i
            U(i,j) = s;
        end
    end
end
```

```matlab
x = u - v;
save optimizeAlicebit.mat
```
if abs(U(i,i)) < tol
    if j == (i+1)
        s = M(i+1,i+1) - U(1:i,j)'*U(1:i,j);
    else
        s = M(i+1,j) - U(1:i,i+1)'*U(1:i,j);
    end
    if abs(s) < tol
        s = 0;
    end
    if j > (i+1)
        if abs(U(i,i+1)) < tol
            U(i,j) = 0;
        else
            U(i,j) = s/U(i,i+1);
        end
    else
        if s < 0
            error('Cholesky matrix U is not positive definite.');
        end
        U(i,i+1) = sqrt(s);
    end
elseif abs(U(i,i)) > tol
    U(i,j) = s/U(i,i);
else
    if s < 0
        error('Cholesky matrix U is not positive definite.');
    end
    U(i,i) = sqrt(s);
end
end
C. Shannon entropy of density operators with known eigenvalues

Calculating eigenvalues of matrices is rather straightforward in MATLAB so the alternative definition of Shannon entropy in terms of eigenvalues is particularly useful here. The only relevant condition to add is to accept only non-zero eigenvalues because the logarithm tends to negative infinity as the eigenvalue approaches zero.

```matlab
function S = entropy(eigrho)
% This function computes the Shannon entropy S for a density operator whose
% eigenvalues eigrho(i) are known.

S = 0; N = length(eigrho);
for i = 1:N
    if ((eigrho(i)) > 0)
        S = S - eigrho(i)*log2(eigrho(i)) ;
    end
end
```

D. Searching for the maximum of a function using the golden ratio method

The golden ratio search is a simple yet robust method for finding the extremum values of a unimodal function over a given interval and successively looking at smaller range of values. It involves dividing the said interval into two parts whose lengths give the golden ratio. The advantage of this method compared to the bisection method is that it converges faster and at a most consistent rate especially in the case when the extremum to be found is close to any midpoint you eventually get during the progressive subdividing.

```matlab
function maxVector = grSearchMax(func, eps, bounds, n)
% This function calculates the local maximum of a function using the golden
% ratio algorithm.
% func is name of function for which max is searched, string format
% bounds is a 2-vector [a b] for the interval (a,b) to be considered
% n is number of iterations
```
Appendix

\[ \phi = \frac{1 + \sqrt{5}}{2}; \ xa = \text{bounds}(1); \ xb = \text{bounds}(2); \]
\[ fa = \text{feval(func,eps, xa)}; \ fb= \text{feval(func,eps, xb)}; \]

\[
\text{for } i = 1:n \\
\quad \text{if } fu > fv \\
\quad\quad \text{maxValue} = fu; \\
\quad\quad \text{maxX} = xu; \\
\quad\quad \text{xb} = xv; \\
\quad\quad \text{else} \\
\quad\quad\quad \text{xa} = xu; \\
\quad\quad\quad \text{maxValue} = fv; \\
\quad\quad\quad \text{maxX} = xv; \\
\quad\quad \text{end} \\
\text{end}
\]

\[
\text{if } (\text{maxValue} < \text{feval(func,eps, bounds(1))) || (maxValue < \text{feval(func,eps,bounds(2)))} \\
\quad \text{if } \text{feval(func,eps,bounds(1)) < feval(func,eps,bounds(2))} \\
\quad\quad \text{maxValue} = \text{feval(func,eps, bounds(2))}; \\
\quad\quad \text{maxX} = \text{bounds}(2); \\
\quad\quad \text{else} \\
\quad\quad\quad \text{maxValue} = \text{feval(func,eps,bounds(1))}; \\
\quad\quad\quad \text{maxX} = \text{bounds}(1); \\
\quad\quad \text{end} \\
\text{end}
\]
\[ \text{maxVector} = [\text{maxX, maxValue}]; \]
E. Calculate the probability matrix table for the double trine given a certain level of noise

This code computes the joint probability matrix for Alice and Bob at various $\epsilon$.

```matlab
function y = infotable(u,v,k)
% This function gives the joint probabilities of Alice sending and Bob measuring different combinations of k-ary digits
% u == diagonal entries: Alice and Bob write down the same digit
% v == off-diagonal entries: Alice and Bob have different digits
% k == size of square matrix: no. of possible digits
y = (eye(k)*u) + ((ones(k)-eye(k))*v);
```

F. Compute the mutual information when given the joint probabilities of measurement outcomes

Given the entropy of various density operators calculated using one of the codes above, this function computes the corresponding mutual information for the given ensemble of states.

```matlab
function y = mutualinfo(s,k)
% This function computes the mutual information given the joint probabilities
y = 0;
for i=1:k
    for j=1:k
        y = y + s(i,j)*(log2((k^2)*s(i,j)));
    end
end
```

G. Mutual information between Alice and Bob during a bit case for the different levels of noise

```matlab
function y = mutualInfoABbit(epsilon)
% Calculates the mutual information in the bit case only
q = infotable((3-epsilon)^2/(9-2*epsilon+epsilon^2)/2, 2*epsilon/(9-2*epsilon+epsilon^2), 2);"
s = mutualinfo(q,2);
y = s;

H. Mutual information between Alice and Bob during a trit case for the different levels of noise

function y = mutualInfoABtrit(epsilon)
% Calculates the mutual information in the trit case only

p = infotable((1/9)*((3-epsilon)/(1+epsilon)), (1/9)*(2*epsilon/(1+epsilon)), 3);
r = mutualinfo(p,3);
y = r;

I. Accessible information between Alice/Bob and Eve during a bit/trit case

The function that computes the Holevo bound at various $\epsilon$. There are four different functions, one for each conditioned ancilla that Eve uses when she eavesdrop on Alice or Bob during the bit or trit case. These are mutualInfoAEbit, mutualInfoAEtrit, mutualInfoBEbit, and mutualInfoBEtrit, where the identity of each is apparent in the label. The bit case for Eve’s ancilla states conditioned on Alice is given in full below and the modified parts for the other scenarios are given after it.

For mutualInfoAEbit:

function y = mutualInfoAEbit(epsilon, c)

% Ejk code
%initialize Ejk states
a = 0; b = 0; u = 0; v = 0;
A = (1/4)*[ (1+a+b+c) u v 0;
conj(u) (1+a-b-c) -2*(1-epsilon) -v;
conj(v) -2*(1-epsilon) (1-a+b-c) -u;
0 -conj(v) -conj(u) (1-a-b+c)];
M = CholeskyDecomposition(A, 10^-13);
E1 = M(:,1); E2 = M(:,2); E3 = M(:,3); E4 = M(:,4); q = (-1 + i*sqrt(3))/2;
for j = 1:3
    for k = 1:3
        Ejk(:,3*j+k-3) = (E1*q^(-j-k) + E2*q^(-j+k) + E3*q^(j-k) + E4*q^(j+k))/9;
    end
end
% designate ancilla states
jj = Ejk(:,1); jk = Ejk(:,2); jll = Ejk(:,3); kj = Ejk(:,4); kl = Ejk(:,5);
kk = Ejk(:,6); ljj = Ejk(:,7); llj = Ejk(:,8); lll = Ejk(:,9);
% product states of ancillas
kkkl = kron(kk,kl); klll = kron(kl,ll); ljkj = kron(lj,kj);
lkkk = kron(lk,kk); llkl = kron(ll,kl); jklk = kron(jk,kl);
jlll = kron(jl,ll); ljjj = kron(lj,jj);
% conditioned ancillas
ARho0 = kjlk*kjlk' + ljjj*ljjj' + kjkk*kkjj' + ...
    kklj*kklj' + lkjj*lkjj' + kkjj*kkjj';
ARho1 = lkkj*kkjj' + jklj*kljj' + jkkj*jjkl' + ...
    ljjl*jjkl' + jllklj*jjkk' + jjkk*jjkk';
ARho0 = (1/2)*ARho0/trace(ARho0);
ARho1 = (1/2)*ARho1/trace(ARho1);
ARho = ARho0 + ARho1;
eigARho0 = eig(ARho0);
eigARho1 = eig(ARho1);
eigARho = eig(ARho);
y = entropy(eigARho) - (1/2)*(entropy(2*eigARho0) + entropy(2*eigARho1));

For mutualInfoAEtrit: (the symbol <Ejk code> indicate that you place the lines of code found within the comment line breaks in mutualInfoAEbit in the indicated position.)

function y = mutualInfoAEtrit(epsilon, c)
< Ejk code >

% conditioned ancillas
ARhoA = kjlj*kjlj' + kklk*kklk' + kl1l*kl1l' + ... 
    ljkj*ljkj' + lkkk*lkkk' + llkl*llkl';

ARhoB = jklk*jklk' + jllj*jllj' + jlll*jlll' + ... 
    lkjk*lkjk' + ljjj*ljjj' + lljl*lljl';

ARhoC = jlkl*jlkl' + jjkj*jjkj' + jkkk*jkkk' + ... 
    kljl*kljl' + kjjj*kjjj' + kkjk*kkjk';

ARhoA = (1/3)*ARhoA / trace(ARhoA);
ARhoB = (1/3)*ARhoB / trace(ARhoB);
ARhoC = (1/3)*ARhoC / trace(ARhoC);
ARhot = ARhoA + ARhoB + ARhoC;

eigARhoA = eig(ARhoA);
eigARhoB = eig(ARhoB);
eigARhoC = eig(ARhoC);
eigARhot = eig(ARhot);

y = entropy(eigARho) - (1/3)*(entropy(3*eigARhoA) 
     + entropy(3*eigARhoB) + entropy(3*eigARhoC));

For mutualInfoBEbit:
function y = mutualInfoBEbit(epsilon, c)
<Ekj code >

% conditioned ancillas
BRho0 = kjlk*kjlk' + ljjk*ljjk' + kjjk*kjkk' + ...
     ljkj*ljk' + jljl*jjlj' + jkkj*jkkk';

BRho1 = lkkj*lkkj' + jklj*jklj' + jkkj*jkkj' + ...
     kklj*kklj' + lkjj*lkjj' + kkjj*kkjj';

BRho0 = (1/2)*BRho0/trace(BRho0);
BRho1 = (1/2)*BRho1/trace(BRho1);
BRho = BRho0 + BRho1;

eigBRho0 = eig(BRho0);
eigBRho1 = eig(BRho1);
eigBRho = eig(BRho);
y = entropy(eigBRho) - (1/2)*(entropy(2*eigBRho0) + entropy(2*eigBRho1));

For mutualInfoBEtrit:

function y = mutualInfoBEtrit(epsilon, c)
<Ekj code >

% conditioned ancillas
BRhoA = kjlj*kjlj' + ljjj*ljjj' + jkkj*jkkj' + ...
      ljkj*ljk' + jljl*jjlj' + kjjj*kjjj';

BRhoB = jlkj*jlkj' + lkkk*lkkk' + kkjk*kkjk' + ...
      lkkk*lkjj' + kkkk*kkkk';

BRhoC = jklj*kljl' + klll*klll' + lljj*lljj' + ...
       kljl*kljl' + llll*lkl + jlll*jlll';

BRhoA = (1/3)*BRhoA / trace(BRhoA);
Appendix

BRhoB = (1/3)*BRhoB / trace(BRhoB);
BRhoC = (1/3)*BRhoC / trace(BRhoC);
BRhot = BRhoA + BRhoB + BRhoC;

eigBRhoA = eig(BRhoA);
eigBRhoB = eig(BRhoB);
eigBRhoC = eig(BRhoC);
eigBRhot = eig(BRhot);
y = entropy(eigBRhot) - (1/3)*(entropy(3*eigBRhoA) +
entropy(3*eigBRhoB) + entropy(3*eigBRhoC));

J. Two-parameter case definition of Eve’s ancilla states

The full optimization with position-order symmetry imposed results in essentially a
two-parameter optimization, according to the parameterization described in Chapter 6.
This function serves the purpose of enforcing the aforementioned choice of parameters
on Eve’s ancillas.

function V = statesEj(parVec)
% This function computes the matrix V such that M = conjtrans(V)*V
% parVec = [a1,a4,r1,r2,theta,phi,lambda, mu]

a1 = parVec(1);a4 = parVec(2);r1 = parVec(3);r2 = parVec(4);
theta = parVec(5); phi = parVec(6); lambda = parVec(7); mu = parVec(8);

E1 = [a1; 0; 0; 0];
E4 = [0; 0; 0; a4];
E2 = [lambda*a4; r1*cos(theta); r1*sin(theta)*exp(-i*phi); conj(mu)*a1];
E3 = [-mu*a4; -r2*sin(theta)*exp(i*phi); -r2*cos(theta); -conj(lambda)*a1];
V = [E1, E2, E3, E4];
K. Two-parameter case optimal search

This functions looks for the maximum for the two parameter case. Because of the complicated nature of the nonlinear constraints, ideally one resorts to algorithm such as steepest-ascent or conjugate-gradient methods. However, this entails translating the constraints in the language of vectors, which is far from straightforward. In order to keep the constraints in the simple form of nonlinear inequalities, we choose a brute-force method that treats the two-parameter space as some set of 2D-lattice points (with spacings as fine as is tractable with our computer) and evaluating the accessible function for different parameter values, singling out the maximum. It is arguably not very efficient but is more than sufficient for our purposes here.

```matlab
function y = searchMax(func, epsilon)

% calculates the maximum in the two-parameter case

mutinf = 0; maxMI = 0; maxVector = zeros(1,8);
x = 1000; w = linspace(-2,2,x);

for j = 1:x
    for k = 1:x
        r1 = w(j); r2 = r1; a1 = w(k); a4 = a1; phi = 0;

        if (r1^2 + r2^2) <= 4 && r1 ~= 0 && a1 ~= 0
            R = sqrt((2 - r1^2)/a1^2-1);
            mu = R*sin(pi/4);
            lambda = mu*sqrt(-1);
            Q = conj(lambda)*mu*(a1^2+a4^2);
            theta = asin((2*(1-epsilon) - real(Q))/(r1*r2*cos(phi)))/2;
            %solve for V and M
            vector = [a1 a4 r1 r2 theta phi lambda mu];
            V = statesEj(vector);
            M = ctranspose(V)*V;

            if trace(M)== 4
```
Ejk = EveAncillas(V);
mutinf = feval(func,Ejk);

if (mutinf > maxMI)
    maxMI = mutinf;
    maxVector = vector;
end
end
end
end
y = [maxMI, maxVector];